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ABSTRACT 
The study of social movement outcomes has started to resurface within social movement 
literature.  This resurfacing of the study of the ultimate dependent variable has led to a 
stronger conceptualization of outcomes as well as better measures of outcomes.  In this 
dissertation, I offer suggestions for how to further strengthen the conceptualization and 
operationalization of social movement outcomes by providing an analytical framework 
that views social movement outcomes as three overlapping arenas: political, cultural, and 
social.  I use three cases of smart growth social movements to demonstrate the usefulness 
of the framework for the study of social movement outcomes.  Following a recent 
program of study within social movement outcomes, the data is analyzed using 
Qualitative Comparative Analysis (Ragin 1987).  By conceptualizing these arenas as 
overlapping and influencing one another, social movement outcomes are not seen as 
occurring all at once at one point in time nor are they seen as resulting in a categorical 
outcome of success or failure.  This conceptualization allows researchers to examine a 
multitude of outcomes, which will help at parsing apart how some causal factors relate to 
specific arenas of outcomes.  Furthermore, this conceptual framework also offers insight 
into how gains in one arena may help or hinder gains in another arena.  
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 In recent years, social movement research has returned to the study of social 
movement outcomes1 (Amenta and colleagues 1992, 1994, 1999, 2004; Andrews 1997, 
2001, 2004; Cress and Snow 1996, 2000; Diani 1997; Earl 2000, 2004; Giugni 1998, 
1999, 2004, 2007; Halebsky 2001, 2006; McCammon and colleagues 2001a, 2001b, 
2007, 2008).  When addressing social movement influence scholars often start by 
examining whether a given outcome would have occurred in absences of social 
movement activity (Amenta and Young 1999).  The central issue then becomes 
empirically demonstrating a causal relationship between movement activity and specific 
outcomes (Giugni 1999; Earl 2000).  In order to meet this task and to deal with social 
movement outcomes validly, we must answer a number of central questions.  First, how 
do we define social movement outcomes?  Likewise, how do we define whether an 
outcome is a success or not?  Finally, how do we measure, precisely, social movement 
outcomes?   
 In this dissertation, I address these questions by examining three land-use social 
movements (also referred to as smart growth movements).  Specifically, I explore the 
emergence, mobilization, and influence of three smart growth social movements located 
in Iowa, Maryland, and New York.  I ask: do grassroots collective action efforts by 
localized community groups positively impact political, social, and/or cultural outcomes?  
Data come from a triangulation of methodologies including participant observation of 
                                                 
1
 Outcomes, influences, and consequences will be used interchangeably throughout this paper.  
In all three cases, I am referring to the changes “caused” within social life that are due to social 
movement activity. 
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movement-related events and activities, in-depth interviews with key stakeholders, and 
content analysis of media coverage, city documents, and smart growth organizational 
literature.  Furthermore, I offer suggestions for how to further strengthen the 
conceptualization and operationalization of social movement outcomes by providing an 
analytical framework that views social movement outcomes as three overlapping arenas: 
political, cultural, and social.  I use three cases of smart growth social movements to 
demonstrate the usefulness of the framework for the study of social movement outcomes.   
Following a recent program of study within social movement outcomes, the data 
is analyzed using Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) (Ragin 1987).  Ragin’s 
(1987) QCA is an inductive, quasi-experimental approach, which relies on the use of 
Boolean algebraic logic for small-N comparisons.  Using the three case studies, I identify 
a complex list of possible causal indicators as well as outcome properties that span across 
the three arenas of movement outcomes.  QCA is used to identify either the absence or 
presence of independent and dependent variables.  Through an in-depth comparison of 
the three case studies, the most relevant causal factors are identified with specific social 
movement outcomes and irrelevant factors are removed from the equation.   
The research findings suggest social movements experience success in a number 
of arenas including increasing social capital, influencing public policy, and swaying 
public opinion.  Furthermore, successes and failures are strongly tied to the joint effects 
of internal social movement characteristics and external environmental factors.  
Additionally, by conceptualizing these arenas as overlapping and influencing one 
another, social movement outcomes are not seen as occurring all at once at one point in 
time nor are they seen as resulting in a categorical outcome of success or failure.  This 
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conceptualization allows researchers to examine a multitude of outcomes, which will help 
at parsing apart how some causal factors relate to specific arenas of outcomes.  
Furthermore, this conceptual framework also offers insight into how gains in one arena 
may help or hinder gains in another arena.   
DEFINING AND MEASURING SOCIAL MOVEMENT OUTCOMES 
Gamson’s study ([1975] 1990) on 53 challenging groups is often identified as the 
seminal research study on social movement outcomes.  In his study, Gamson examines 
the role of internal movement characteristics on social movement outcomes.  The internal 
movement characteristics that Gamson emphasizes are organizational variables, 
specifically structure, goals, and tactics used by the challenging group.  Gamson 
examines the influence of these internal movement characteristics on “successful” gains 
in two areas of outcomes: acceptance and new advantages.  Acceptance is when the 
challenging group is seen by the antagonist as a legitimate set of interests.  New 
advantages are in reference to the attainment of goals sought by the challenging group.  
What Gamson found was that single issue and nondisplacing (i.e., reformist not 
revolutionary) demands, the use of violent or disruptive tactics, and highly formalized 
organization (i.e., bureaucratic and centralized) were positively related to “acceptance” 
and “new advantages” by the challenging group.   
 Despite a number of consistent findings regarding Gamson’s claims (Frey, Dietz, 
and Kalof 1992; Giugni 1998), a reanalysis of Gamson’s data by Goldstone (1980) 
provided an alternative explanation to successful outcomes.  In addition to examining 
internal social movement characteristics, Goldstone looked at the broader socio-political 
context and how this related to successful outcomes.  What Goldstone found was that 
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internal movement characteristics identified by Gamson had no effect on the successful 
attainment of acceptance or new advantages.  Rather, it was the timing of movement 
action during periods of “national crisis” that predicted successful gains by challenging 
groups.  Gamson’s (1990) central findings were also challenged by Piven and Cloward 
(1979) who supported Gamson’s claim that disruptive tactics are important, but just as 
important is the opportunity that a divided elite provides for successful movement 
outcomes.  Piven and Cloward (1979) also argued that “new advantages” were not useful 
measures of success for the poor people movements because new advantages may be 
beneficial to SMOs but rarely have any lasting or direct effect on the intended 
beneficiaries (i.e., disadvantaged and disenfranchised peoples).  The extensive 
examination and subsequent discussion of Gamson’s work has led to a number of issues.  
The first issue is in relation to a number of conceptual problems including identifying 
what constitutes “success” or “failure” of a social movement outcome as well as 
differentiating between intended and unintended outcomes.  The second issue is related to 
potential causal factors (internal movement characteristics or external environmental 
factors) that influence certain outcomes.  I will start by identifying how outcomes have 
typically been addressed within social movement studies, and I will offer a conceptual 
framework for how to organize social movement outcomes for future study. 
Defining what constitutes a social movement outcome is often a difficult task.  
The difficulty in defining an outcome is due in part to the fact that social movements can 
influence many different areas of social life simultaneously.  As stated by Cress and 
Snow (2000), social movement outcomes can vary greatly “extending from state-level 
policy decisions to expansion of a movement’s social capital to changes in participants’ 
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biographies” (2000: 1064).  In addition, social movement outcomes can be intended or 
unintended.  That is, did social movement actors intentionally target something as a 
preferable outcome (e.g., change in public policy), or was an outcome the result of 
unintentional consequences of social movement mobilization (e.g., collective identity)?  
Related to whether the outcome is intended or unintended is the question of whether or 
not an outcome is able to be empirically investigated?  Outcomes can be easily and 
directly measured as is the case with some public policy legislation and securing financial 
resources for at risk populations, or it can be much more difficult to empirically measure 
as is the case with changes in values and norms and changes in structural location within 
a social network.   
Another important factor is related to what constitutes a “successful” outcome.  
Some social movements may get sympathetic individuals into important positions of 
power, may get favorable legislation passed, may secure valuable financial resources, and 
may have widespread support for their cause.  However, the social movement may never 
demonstrate any actual changes to the beneficiary group (e.g., alleviating poverty).  It 
could also be the case that outcomes are not realized until long after a social movement 
has demobilized.  Because many social movements attack systemic problems within 
political and social structure, their influence is typically not realized until long after their 
mobilization.  There may be evidence of short term successes as is the case with 
influencing the political agenda and getting favorable legislation passed, but the more 
systemic target of a social movement may not be realized until long after the social 
movement has come to an end.  In some cases, evidence of short term successes never 
actually translates into systemic changes later on. 
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CHAPTER II 
THE EFFECT: ARENAS OF SOCIAL MOVEMENT OUTCOMES 
INTRODUCTION 
 There are many different areas of social life that can be influenced by social 
movement activity (most notable summaries provided by Amenta and Caren 2004; 
Andrews 2004; Earl 2000, 2004; and Giugni 1998, 1999, 2004, 2007).  However, the 
optimal strategy for defining and measuring the impact of social movements is to include 
a variety of outcome measures that span across different points in time and different 
arenas of social life (Andrews 2004).  By having a multitude of outcome measures, 
researchers can move beyond successful or unsuccessful categorical outcomes and move 
closer to identifying outcomes as continuous measures that distinguish between levels of 
successful and unsuccessful outcomes.  Examining outcome measures across time helps 
distinguish between short-term and long-term outcomes, which in turn also offers more 
accurate pictures of successful and unsuccessful outcomes.  Finally, discriminating 
among “arenas” of social life offers crucial insight into intended and unintended 
outcomes, and more importantly, allows the analyst to examine how outcomes in 
different areas of social life relate to one another (Andrews 2004: 19).  I discuss these 
areas of social life as “arenas” and divide them into: (1) political, (2) cultural, and (3) 
social outcomes2 (see Figure 1).   
 
 
 
                                                 
2
 Although I have taken the advice of Andrews (2004) to look at outcomes as arenas of social life, 
the conceptual framework for the dividing outcomes into political, social, and cultural outcomes 
and depicting them as interacting and overlapping arenas of social life comes from Flora and 
Flora (2004, 2008) community capitals framework (CCF). 
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Figure 1. Arenas of Social Movement Outcomes 
 
 
Political outcomes make up the overwhelming majority of research on social 
movement outcomes, and typically refer to changing or implementing public policy, 
setting or influencing political agendas, gaining important representations, and securing 
resources for beneficiaries (Amenta and Caren 2004).  Cultural and social outcome have 
been studied far less than political outcomes.  Within the literature, cultural outcomes 
typically refer to one or a combination of the following: attitudes, opinions, values, 
knowledge, tactical repertoires, collective action frames, cultural narratives, and 
collective identities.  Social outcomes usually include changes in individual and personal 
biographies, arrangements of social networks or social capital for mobilizing groups. 
POLITICAL OUTCOMES 
 Gamson’s (1990) study of challenging groups was focused solely on political 
outcomes.  Specifically, Gamson identified two potential outcomes: new advantages and 
acceptance.  Using these two areas of political outcomes, he creates a two-by-two table 
that depicts a range of potential outcomes from complete success to complete failure.  
When challenging groups achieve both new advantages and acceptance, Gamson refers to 
this as “full response.”  On the other side of the equation, for those groups that neither 
Political 
Outcomes 
Cultural 
Outcomes 
Social 
Outcomes 
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achieves new advantages nor acceptance, he refers to this as a “collapse.”  A combination 
of the two, or achieving one but not the other, is either “co-optation” (or acceptance 
without new advantages) or “preemption” (or new advantages without acceptance).  As 
mentioned earlier, there have been a number of criticisms of Gamson’s study.  Many 
researchers have commented on problems in the conceptualization of outcomes as well as 
how this framework differentiates complete success, partial success, and failure (Piven 
and Cloward 1979; Goldstone 1980; Amenta, Dunleavy, and Berstein 1994).  For 
example, Amenta et al (1994) criticize Gamson’s conceptualization of success on a 
number of points.  The main criticism, however, is that Gamson’s definition does not 
lend itself to thorough measurement of new advantages; specifically, gains in “collective 
benefits for beneficiary groups” (1994: 681).  As a result, collective benefits do not 
consider gains made on behalf of the beneficiary group.  According to Amenta et al 
(1994), it is gains made in ways of collective goods on behalf of the beneficiary group 
that directly measure “success.”  The authors argue “that a challenger cannot be 
considered successful unless it wins some collective goods that aid its beneficiary group” 
(681).   
Taking note of Amenta et al (1994) concerns, Cress and Snow (2000), in a study 
of 15 homeless social movement organizations in eight US cities, offer a measure that 
distinguishes between political outcomes that relate to the SMO and those that relate to 
the beneficiary group.   Organizational outcomes are measures of whether or not the 
SMO gained important representation (similar to Gamson’s acceptance) within decision 
making bodies, and whether or not the SMO attained the necessary resources such as 
financial, human, and built capital to organize and mobilize potential adherents.  
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Beneficiary outcomes are measures that directly help in alleviating conditions of 
homeless populations; in other words, offer relief, or to protect the local homeless 
populations from discriminatory practices, or offer them rights.  The distinction made by 
Cress and Snow (2000) deal with many of the concerns raised by Amenta and colleagues 
about successful political outcomes including some sort of measurement of direct 
beneficiary outcomes. 
 More recently, Amenta and Caren (2004) attempted to further remedy problems 
with the new advantages and acceptance distinction.  With new advantages, the authors 
suggest that political outcomes need to include a multitude of outcome measures.  They 
suggest outcomes that relate to actions against the state including (1) setting political 
agendas, (2) influencing legislative content, (3) passing and implementing legislation, 
and (4) influencing structural/systemic reforms.  As for acceptance, Gamson (1990) 
argued acceptance was achieved if a challenging group was invited to testify in front of 
Congress.  However, Amenta and Caren (2004) point out that acceptance also needs to 
move beyond simply testifying in front of a political body.  Their suggestion is to 
distinguish among types of acceptance such as negotiation, formal recognition, and 
inclusion (gaining formal representation in decision-making organizations).   
 In sum, early studies of political outcomes focused on whether a group gained 
acceptance and/or new advantages from collective mobilization.  Following a thorough 
examination of these two dimensions of outcomes, researchers have argued Gamson’s 
original conceptualization of acceptance and new advantages as political outcomes is 
insufficient.  As a result, researchers have pushed for greater specificity by using multiple 
indicators for both acceptance and new advantages.  In addition, measures of political 
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outcomes need to distinguish between those successes that relate to participants of the 
social movement and those successes that directly benefit the target group.  Related to 
new advantages, measures should include a variety of outcomes including agenda setting, 
influencing legislative content, passing/implementing short-term legislative benefits 
(SMO and beneficiary), and influencing long-term systemic change (again differentiating 
between SMO and beneficiary).  For acceptance, measures should include and 
differentiate between such outcomes as involvement in negotiations, formal recognition 
by political bodies, and inclusion or representation in decision making. 
CULTURAL OUTCOMES   
 Another arena of social movement outcomes is cultural outcomes.  Cultural 
outcomes have largely been ignored within the study of social movement outcomes (Earl 
2000, 2004).  One of the major problems with focusing almost exclusively on political 
outcomes is that other areas of social life influenced by social movement activity such as 
general public opinion and attitudes, social norms and values, knowledge and traditions, 
other social movements, and collective identities have been mostly excluded from 
theorizing on social movement outcomes (Goodwin and Jasper 1999; Poletta 1999; Earl 
2000, 2004; Polletta and Jasper 2001).  Like political outcomes, one of the main 
problems is clearly and adequately defining what constitutes a cultural outcome.  This is 
complicated even more by the lack of theoretical coherence regarding definitions of 
culture (Earl 2004).  For example, culture can be defined in social psychological terms as 
the meanings and symbols internal to the individual.  Culture can also be seen as a 
negotiation of meanings and signs as well as how these symbols relate to one another.  Or 
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culture can be described as larger macro level phenomenon that is both structural and 
constraining (Earl 2004).   
As such, culture is not only within the minds of individuals and negotiated 
through micro level interactions but it is also embedded in social structure; not only in the 
way that we interpret structure but also how social structure shapes individuals’ values, 
attitudes, opinions, and beliefs.  On the one hand, culture can be seen as the perceptions 
social movement participants have of objective structural opportunities as well as the 
subjective processes of participants that occur through ongoing social interactions and 
result in shared meanings.  On the other hand, culture can be seen as structure in the form 
of “cultural traditions, ideological principles, institutional memories, and political taboos 
that create and limit political opportunities” (Poletta 1999: 63).  Conceptualizing culture 
as both subjective meaning construction and objective structure can help with both 
defining and measuring social movement outcomes within the cultural arena.  
Social movement studies on cultural outcomes, although limited and usually not 
defined as a “social movement outcome” per se, have been studied both at the micro and 
meso/macro levels of cultural change.  The research focuses primarily on changes in 
attitudes and opinions, norms and values, knowledge and traditions, tactical repertoires, 
collective action frames, cultural narratives, and collective identities.  For example, in a 
study of the abolitionist movement in England, d’Anjou and Van Male (1998) explore 
how activism by abolitionists influenced changes in the values, beliefs, and opinions of 
the broader general public.  The authors show how activists link their message to 
generally accepted cultural values and relate them to new emerging cultural themes.  By 
doing so, they are able to depict a gradual shift in how the general public viewed and 
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defined the slave trade.  They found that the first wave of abolitionist activity, although it 
did not abolish slavery and the slave trade, did fundamentally change how these issues 
were viewed by the broader public.  Furthermore, it was this early wave of activism that 
paved the way for the later abolition of slavery in England (d’Anjou 1996). 
Similarly to his (1990) original study on political outcomes, Gamson (1998) also 
showed how successfully influence can occur within the cultural realm.  Gamson (1998) 
addresses these outcomes by looking at cultural acceptance (i.e., being quoted regularly 
within the media) and new cultural advantages (i.e., movement frames being adopted 
over alternative frames).  By following the logic that media affects public opinion, 
Gamson (1998) argues success within the cultural arena can be attained when movements 
gain cultural acceptance and new cultural advantages.  This occurs when social 
movement frames are covered more readily by media outlets and when their frames are 
depicted more prominently than the frames of the antagonist.  Social movements that gain 
access and coverage to media outlets are able to more successfully influence attitudes and 
opinions and values and norms of the general public.   
A particularly interesting example of social movement activity influencing 
cultural outcomes can be seen in a study of AIDS activists (Epstein 1996).  Epstein 
examines the role that AIDS activists played in shaping scientific practices and 
interpretations of HIV and AIDS; specifically how these activists challenged and shaped 
scientific procedures and knowledge.  What he found was that activists played an 
extremely important role in challenging and eventually changing treatment and drug test 
protocols used in clinical trials of HIV/AIDS medications.  The author also examined 
how activists tried but failed to influence an explanation for the cause of AIDS.  Despite 
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their failure to influence the search for the cause of AIDS, activists played a central role 
in redefining the knowledge, or the know-how, for running, testing, and implementing 
clinical trial practices.   
Another important area where social movements impact knowledge is related to 
what Tilly (1978) and Tarrow (1994) refer to as tactical repertoire.  Tactical repertoire is 
the tactics and strategies available to social movements (Tilly 1978).  Tactical repertoires 
change where new, innovative tactics emerge and old tactics are reused and reconfigured.  
The use of widespread and popular forms of tactics and strategies during peak cycles of 
protest are referred to as “repertoires of contention” (Tarrow 1994).  In any cultural 
arena, social movements share and shape common repertoires of contention.  This is 
because the tactics and strategies selected by SMOs and social movement actors are those 
that are culturally available and culturally acceptable.  So, whether it is the white 
separatist movement holding a public demonstration on the steps of the state capital, pro-
life activists singing “We Shall Overcome,” or a progrowth countermovement 
organization using copycat framing techniques, social movements across the political 
spectrum share and influence a common tactical repertoire. 
 In addition to the social movements influencing one another’s tactical repertoire, 
they can also have a wide range of impacts on other movements including knowledge of 
effective organizational forms and effective collective action frames (Meyer and Whittier 
1994).  Meyer and Whittier argue that social movements mobilize and organize in 
reference to what other social movements have done.  They refer to this as “spillover 
effects.”  Spillover effects can include organizational forms, tactics and strategies, 
collective action frames and discourse, and identities.  Each of these can be transferred 
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from one movement to another in a number of ways including shared membership, 
organizational coalitions, discourse within external environment, or by just sheer chance 
(Whittier 2004).  What this means for the study of social movement outcomes, then, is 
that social movement mobilization not only influence attitudes, opinions, values, and 
norms of the general public, but they can also shape the tactics, strategies, organizational 
form, and framing techniques used by other social movements. 
 Regarding collective identity, researchers have suggested that the creation of new 
collective identities may be an outcome in and of itself, or it may be an unintentional 
consequence of movement activity (Polletta and Jasper 2001).  In both cases, the creation 
of new social identities may have a lasting effect in shared collective identities that 
remain over time (usually tied to “abeyance structures,” see Taylor and Whittier 1992).  I 
refer here to collective identity as “an individual’s cognitive, moral, and emotional 
connection with a broader community, category, practice, or institution.  It is a perception 
of a shared status or relation, which may be imagined rather than experienced directly…” 
(Polletta and Jasper 2001: 285).  As such, collective identities can be represented in 
material and nonmaterial things including “names, narratives, symbols, verbal styles, 
rituals, clothing, and so on” (285).  Collective identity as a cultural outcome can be either 
an intended outcomes, or they can be unintended outcome.   
In summary, social movements have been found to have a wide array of impacts 
within the cultural arena.  Social movement activity can and does result in fundamental 
changes in attitudes, opinions, values, and norms of the general public.  Collective 
mobilization also influences systems of knowledge and traditions.  Social movements 
also influence changes in the cultural arena through shaping how other social movements 
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decide to organize, mobilize, and act.  Finally, social movements can and do influence 
how people identify not only themselves but others as well.   
SOCIAL OUTCOMES 
 Similar to cultural outcomes, social outcomes have been a severely understudied 
area.  With the exception of a handful of scholars (most notably Diani 1997, Andrews 
2004, and Giugni 2004), components of social outcomes such as social networks/capital 
and social organization have been examined largely in relation to movement emergence 
and mobilization.  There are a vast number of research studies that have explored the role 
of pre-existing or indigenous social organization as a precursor to successful emergence 
and mobilization (Jenkins and Perrow 1977; Morris 1981; McAdam 1982).  There are 
also a number of studies that have examined the role of social networks on successful 
recruitment and mobilization of potential movement adherents (Snow, Zurcher, and 
Ekland-Olson 1980; Gould 1991; Diani 1997).  However, here I am interested in research 
that focuses on the impact social movements have on the arena of social outcomes.  More 
specifically, I refer to social outcomes as changes in individual and personal biographies 
and social networks/capital.   
Within social movement literature, research suggests individuals who participate 
in social movements are greatly influenced by their experience.  This is the case for core 
members as well as peripheral members (Polletta and Jasper 2001).  This finding is also 
extended to aggregate level life-course patterns of individuals (e.g., the effect of the 
women’s movement on the roles of individual women in society) (Giugni 2004).  For 
example, the biographical effects of New Left activists suggest individuals who 
participated in the movement showed strong leanings to leftist ideals later in life and 
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continued involvement in other social movements throughout their life (see Fendrich 
1993 and Giugni 2004).  In addition, individuals who participated in this movement were 
overwhelmingly represented in teaching professions, had higher rates of divorce, and had 
lower levels of income than those who of the same generation (McAdam 1988, 1989; 
also see Giugni 2004). 
Another area of research, although very limited, is related to the effect of social 
movement activity on social networks and social capital.  Diani (1997) views social 
capital as linkages among individuals and organizations that are made up of mutual trust 
and recognition.  The formation of social capital is important to the study of social 
movements because it allows for explanation of both social movement emergence and 
subsequent mobilization efforts as well as explanation of successful or unsuccessful 
outcomes in other arenas of social life.  These social ties allow for the social movement 
to gain traction early on and to increase chances for success later (Diani 1997).  A main 
point of Diani (1997) is that social networks as a measure of social outcomes need to be 
analyzed and evaluated according to how much a SMO or movement actor changes in 
structural location of a social networks.  In other words, by focusing on changes in social 
network location, social movement outcomes within the social arena “may be assessed in 
terms of the movements’ capacity to achieve more central positions in networks of social 
and political influence” (1997: 133). 
In summary, social movement activity has been shown to influence both social 
movement participants as well as aggregate level life course patterns.  Social movements 
are also linked to changes in social network, in the arrangement linkages and flow of 
social capital, and in social organization.   
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OVERLAPPING ARENAS OF OUTCOMES 
 Although political, cultural, and social outcome has been discussed individually, 
they should not be seen as separate.  Rather, each arena should be seen as overlapping 
with one another.  This suggests that gains in one arena my either help or hinder attempts 
to make gains in another.  For example, researchers have shown that gains in the cultural 
arena such as changes in attitudes and opinions and norms and values play an important 
role in successful outcomes within the political arena such as changes to public policy 
(Burstein et al 1995; d’Anjou and Von Male 1998; Gamson 1998; Meyer 2006).  
Researchers have also shown how successful gains in the cultural arena (e.g., sharing 
tactics) may impede progress within the political arena.  For example, when groups tend 
to share tactics, or have tactical overlap, the movement sector becomes saturated 
increasing competition and decreasing legitimation of social movement actors (Olzak and 
Uhrig 2001). 
 Gains in the social arena may also influence success within the political arena.  
The creation of movement infrastructure (Andrews 2004), changes in structural location 
of movement actors and organizations within broader social networks (Diani 1997), or 
simply remaining in existence for long period time (Minkoff 1993) can influence 
mobilization efforts of the same social movement at a later point in time, or it may pave 
the way for different social movements later.   Changes in structural locations in localized 
social networks may also strongly affect chances for success within the cultural arena as 
well (Diani 1997).  Claims-makers in positions of authority and who hold legitimacy 
within the broader social and political environment have greater chance of having their 
stories stick (Meyer 2006) and their frames adopted over other competing frames 
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(Benford and Snow 2000).  In addition, strong social networks have also been shown to 
create salient collective identities and to socialize social movement participants (Passy 
2001). 
Finally, success within the political arena can influence changes in both the 
cultural and social arenas.  For example, when groups gain acceptance, or are seen as 
legitimate actors within the political arena, they increase their chances of creating a 
collective identity recognized by both those within as well as outside of the movement.  If 
the group is newly formed and still in the early stages of negotiation over collective 
identity, the recognition within the political arena can speed this process along and can 
draw in other potential adherents to the movement further solidifying a new collective 
identity (Amenta and Young 1999).  Also, successes within the political arena may 
influence success within the social arena.  For instance, when a social movement has 
success in the political arena such as gaining new advantages (e.g., opening up political 
opportunity structures), other social movements may begin to form and mobilize in areas 
of social life were they were not able to before (Whittier 2004). 
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CHAPTER III 
THE CAUSE: SMO-CONTROLLED AND ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS 
INTRODUCTION 
 Equally as elusive as defining and measuring outcomes is identifying, 
conceptualizing, and operationalizing the potential causal factors that either facilitate or 
impede social movements in their quest to attain certain outcomes.  The difficulty lies in 
both the amorphous nature of social movements and the vast areas of social life they 
target.  Here the problem lies in identifying who is actually a part of the movement, who 
or what is the target of collective action, and who or what is actually influencing a given 
outcome.  All three of these things make demonstrating causal influence very difficult. 
Within the study of social movement outcomes, there are three schools of thought 
that attempt to explain successful and unsuccessful outcomes.  The first school attributes 
success or failure of social movements to their organizational form (Gamson 1990), their 
strategies and tactics (McAdam 1983, Clemens 1993; Ganz 2000), their frame resonance 
(Cress and Snow 2000; Halebsky 2006), and their resources (McCarthy and Zald 1973, 
1977).  A second school of thought suggests that success or failure is determined not by 
internal movement characteristics but rather environmental factors such as social strain, 
conflict, or breakdown (Goldstone 1991; Useem 1985), the strength of indigenous social 
organization (Morris 1981; McAdam 1982), political opportunities (Jenkins and Perrow 
1977; McAdam 1982), and political and social context (Kitschelt 1986; Amenta et al 
1992).  The final school of thought attributes successful or unsuccessful outcomes to a 
combination of internal movement characteristics and external environmental factors 
(Amenta et al 1992, 1994, 1996, 1999; Giugni 2004, 2007).   
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SMO-CONTROLLED FACTORS 
Much attention has been given to factors internal to the social movement that 
relate to successful outcomes3.  The primary factors related to successful outcomes 
include organizational structure, movement goals, resources, leadership, tactics and 
strategies, framing techniques, and collective identity (see Table 1). 
Table 1. SMO Controlled Factors and Social Movement Outcomes 
SMO Controlled Factors Political 
Outcomes 
Cultural 
Outcomes 
Social 
Outcomes 
Formalized SMO (Cress & Snow 1996, 2000; Gamson 1990, 1998; 
Meyer and Whittier 1994; Whittier 2004) 
 
+ + + 
Goals 
-Single issue and non-displacing (Gamson 1990) 
 
 
+ 
 
? 
 
+ 
Resources 
-Human capital (Cress & Snow 2000; Halebsky 2006; McAdam 1988; 
McCarthy 1987; McCarthy & Wolfson 1996; McCarthy & Zald 1977; 
Polletta & Jasper 2001) 
-Financial capital (McCarthy 1987; McCarthy & Wolfson 1996; 
McCarthy & Zald 1977; Rucht 1999) 
-Social capital (Diani 1997; Passy 2001; Snow et al 1980) 
 
 
+ 
 
+ 
 
 
+ 
 
? 
 
? 
 
 
+ 
 
+ 
 
+ 
 
 
+ 
Leadership 
-Possess high levels social capital (Ganz 2000; McCarthy & Wolfson 
1996; Morris 1984; Robnett 1996) 
-Experience, knowledge, repertoire (Ganz 2000; Nepstad & Bob 
2006) 
 
 
+ 
 
+ 
 
+ 
 
+ 
 
+ 
 
+ 
Strategy and tactics 
-Disruptive/innovative (Clemens 1993; Gamson 1990; McAdam 
1983) 
-Strategic adaptation (McCammon et al 2008) 
 
 
+ 
 
+ 
 
+ 
 
+ 
 
+ 
 
+ 
Collective action frames 
-Clear diagnostic framing (Cress & Snow 2000; Snow & Benford 
1988) 
-Clear prognostic framing (Cress & Snow 2000; Snow & Benford 
1988)  
-Broadly framed threat (Halebsky 2006; Walsh et al 1997) 
-Strategic frames (McCammon et al 2007) 
 
+ 
 
+ 
 
+ 
+ 
 
+ 
 
+ 
 
? 
? 
 
+ 
 
+ 
 
+ 
+ 
    
 
Early research, most notably Gamson’s (1990) work, relates to issues of 
organizational form, movement goals, and resource mobilization.  Gamson (1990) 
concludes the most successful challenging groups (e.g., gains in the political arena or 
                                                 
3
 It is important to state that the vast majority of the research relates to successful political 
outcomes. 
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acceptance and new advantages) were highly formalized, had a single issue focus, and 
made “nondisplacing” demands.  Cress and Snow (1996, 2000) also found evidence of 
formalized homeless movement organizations (referred to as organizational viability) as 
an indicator of successful gains in political representation.  Although Cress and Snow 
(2000) do not discuss social outcomes as such, the outcome for SMO in relation to 
gaining important access to decision making bodies and mobilizing large numbers of 
supporter suggests a relationship between organization viability and social outcomes such 
as change in structural location.  Organizational form can also influence outcomes in the 
cultural arena.  For example, SMOs can maintain an organizational form that 
intentionally links itself to other link-minded organizations either transfer out or take in 
salient collective identities, collective action frames, or tactical repertoire (Meyer and 
Whittier 1994; Whittier 2004).   
Although addressed in Gamson’s (1990) original assessment, it is resource 
mobilization that has devoted a great deal of attention to the role of human and financial 
capital in the successful attainment of social movement outcomes.  Resource mobilization 
suggests mobilization and subsequent outcomes can be explained by the availability and 
attainment of valuable resources by SMOs.  In other words, effective SMOs are ones that 
can attain goals through attracting and maintaining the adequate resources such as time, 
money, and movement adherents (Oberschall 1973; McCarthy and Zald 1973, 1977; Tilly 
1978).  To demonstrate this point, McCarthy (1987) found that pro-life and pro-choice 
social movements both relied on valuable resources to successfully mobilize movement 
adherents.   Pro-life organizations relied almost exclusively on committed volunteers; 
whereas pro-choice organizations had a much more extensive financial base.  Both 
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played into mobilizing successful political outcomes such as gaining access to 
governmental officials and social outcomes such as increasing membership and 
influencing public opinion and attitudes.  Most importantly, movements must have 
committed core members (McCarthy and Zald 1973, 1977). 
 Diani (1997) suggests that social capital also plays a central role in the successful 
social movement outcomes.  Social capital, or networks of exchange, trust, solidarity, and 
communication, not only influence if and when a social movement emerges, but it also 
plays a very important role in predicting how successful a movement is in the long run.  
SMOs, movement leadership, and movement participants that have open networks of 
communication and exchange, relationships based on trust and solidarity, connections to 
sympathetic elites, and overlapping membership with other organizations are much more 
likely to achieve successful social movement outcomes.  For example, social networks 
help recruit and mobilize potential adherents quickly (Snow, Zurcher, and Ekland-Olson 
1980), which in turn can help the movement in the political arena.  Open social networks 
can also act as crucial mechanisms of socialization helping create salient collective 
identities (Passy 2001). 
 Leadership of SMOs and social movements are of crucial importance as well.  
Leaders have a disproportionate amount of influence in deciding goals, strategies, tactics, 
and collective action frames.  The movement’s leaders are usually embedded in 
structurally advantageous positions within broader networks of social capital.  As a result, 
they can mobilize important resources quickly and can become seen as the legitimate 
spokesperson or claims-makers of the movement (Nepstad and Bob 2006).  Leaders who 
are centrally located in social networks are more likely to be successful on the political 
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front because they can withstand cooptation (Morris 1984; Robnett 1996).  McCarthy and 
Wolfson (1996) found a consistent predictor of large numbers of participants is related to 
the number of public appearances by leadership of anti-drunk driving groups.  According 
to Ganz (2000), in addition to organizational form, differences in leadership biography, 
networks, and repertoires can lead to successful gains in the political arena (1041).  By 
examining the leadership of four different social movements, Nepstad and Bob (2006) 
identify a combination of factors, together referred to as leadership capital, including 
cultural, social, and symbolic capital as positively related to successful political, cultural, 
and social outcomes. 
 Strategies and tactics used by social movements have also been linked to social 
movement outcomes.  Gamson (1990) identified the use of disruptive tactics, specifically 
violent tactics, as a strong indicator of successful political outcomes regarding new 
advantages and acceptance.  McAdam (1983) and Clemens (1993) also found disruptive 
tactics, although referred to as innovative or new tactics, as predictors of movement 
success.  Clemens (1993) shows how women’s groups during the late 19th and early 20th 
century helped transform the educational lobbying system by using innovative tactics.  
By being barred from voting, Women’s Rights groups garnered the political, social, 
financial, and human capital to force important legislation.  The use of innovative tactics 
also helped draw in broad based support and strengthen collective identity of women’s 
rights participants.  Ganz’s (2000) “strategic capacity,” Andrews’ (2001) “strategic 
infrastructure, and more recently, McCammon et al (2008) “strategic adaptation,” all deal 
with the relationship between SMO strategies/tactics and social movement outcomes.  
McCammon and colleagues (2008) use of strategic adaptation incorporates an SMO’s 
24 
 
 
 
ability and willingness to perceive, evaluate, adapt, and implement changes in tactics that 
correspond with the environment.  In a study of jury rights movements during the early 
part of the 20th century, the authors found movement proponents succeed at a faster rate 
when they responded quickly following legislative defeat and in a way that drew on the 
social, cultural, and political cues from the environment (i.e., fostering political 
connections with sympathetic elites, mobilizing around political candidates, using 
wartime as a strategic frame for expanding the view of women as citizen). 
Collective action frames, or frames intended to mobilize social movement 
supporters, have also been linked to social movement outcomes.  According to Snow and 
Benford (1988), collective action frames have three framing tasks: diagnostic, prognostic, 
and motivational.  The authors argue the success of social movements is in part related to 
how well movement participants create and maintain these tasks in a way that resonates 
with target populations.  Cress and Snow (2000) found that either diagnostic (those which 
clearly identify a problem), prognostic (those which clearly define a solution) frames, or 
both, are positively related to successful outcomes (i.e., representation, resources, relief, 
and rights).  Although not specifically related to framing tasks, in a study of local land-
use controversies over eight waste incinerators, Walsh, Warland, and Smith (1997) found 
controversies broadly framed (i.e., threat to local versus larger geographical area) were 
more successful and drew more supporters.  Similarly, in a study of six different anti-
Superstore movements, Halebsky (2006) found that broadly framed threats to the 
community acted as an important indicator of movement success as defined by drawing 
the support and either stopping or delaying the siting of Wal-Mart Superstores.  Benford 
and Snow (2000) suggest that frames can be used as “strategic frames” that are 
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“developed and deployed to achieve specific purpose” (264).  In a study of strategic 
frames used by women’s rights organizations during the early 20th to gain the right for 
women to sit on juries, McCammon et al (2007) found framing effectiveness must be 
considered with the social, cultural, and political context.  That is, frames must tap into 
culturally, socially, and politically relevant factors that resonate with potential adherents 
(i.e., using a master frame such as equality to argue women were just as competent as 
men to serve on juries). 
ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS 
The second school of thought focuses primarily on the environmental factors that 
help or hinder social movements in their attainment of social movement outcomes.  
Environmental factors include breakdown or strain, political opportunity structures, 
existing social organization, and political, social, and cultural context (see Table 2). 
Table 2. Environmental Factors and Social Movement Outcomes 
Environmental Factors Political 
Outcomes 
Cultural 
Outcomes 
Social 
Outcomes 
Breakdown, strain, and conflict 
-Crises (Goldstone 1980, 1991) 
 
 
+ 
 
? 
 
? 
Political opportunity structure  
-Openness (Jenkins & Perrow 1977; Kitschelt 1986; Kriesi 1995; 
Meyer 2004; McAdam1996) 
-Elite instability (Jenkins & Perrow 1977; Jenkins et al 2003; 
Kriesi 1995; Meyer 2004; McAdam 1996) 
-Repression (Kitschelt 1986; Kriesi 1995) 
-Sympathetic elites (Jenkins & Perrow 1977; Jenkins et al 2003; 
Kriesi 1995; Stearns & Almeida 2004) 
-Gendered opportunity structures (McCammon et al 2001a, 2001b, 
2007, 2008) 
 
 
+ 
 
+ 
- 
 
+ 
 
+ 
 
? 
 
? 
? 
 
? 
 
+ 
 
? 
 
? 
? 
 
? 
 
? 
Indigenous organization  
-Prior leadership (Andrews 2004; McAdam 1982, 1996) 
-Other movements (Andrews 2004; McAdam 1982, 1996) 
-Networks of resources and communication (Andrews 2004; 
McAdam 1982, 1996) 
 
 
+ 
+ 
+ 
 
? 
? 
? 
 
? 
? 
? 
Social and political environment 
-Favorable public opinion 
-Media coverage (Halebsky 2006) 
-Countermovement 
 
+ 
+/- 
- 
 
? 
? 
? 
 
? 
? 
? 
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 As mentioned earlier, Goldstone’s (1980) reanalysis of Gamson’s data suggested 
that successful outcomes were related to timing of movement action and periods of 
national crisis.  In his study of revolutions in Europe, China, and the Middle East, 
Goldstone (1991) found periods of state crises (specifically divisions over economic 
concerns) caused by rapid population growth helped fuel political revolutions.  As such, 
it was not internal movement characteristics that lead to successful revolution; rather, it 
was periods of crisis. This sentiment is echoed in studies of political opportunity 
structures, or POS.  The focus, however, is on favorable political conditions that are 
absolutely essential for successful movement outcomes (McAdam 1982, 1983).  The 
ability for a social movement to attain successful outcomes is focused on the “exogenous 
factors enhance or inhibit a social movement’s prospects” (Meyer 2004: 126).  Research 
that focuses on four factors:   
1. The relative openness or closure of the institutionalized political system 
2. The stability or instability of that broad set of elite alignments that typically undergird a polity 
3. The presence or absence of elite allies 
4. The state’s capacity and propensity for repression (McAdam 1996: 27). 
 
Like Goldstone (1991), Kriesi and Wisler (1999) found democratic social movements 
influenced institutional level change within the US and Switzerland political system 
during periods of crisis.  Additionally, in both cases, there were weak state institutions, 
credible alternative institutions, divided elites and diminished political parties.  In his 
study of anti-nuclear movements in four democracies (United States, Sweden, France, 
and Germany), Kitschelt (1986) found that POS that are more open (US and Sweden) 
allow social movements to have a better chance of gaining acceptance and to have more 
procedural gains than social movements in countries with domestic POS that are closed 
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(France and West Germany).  The author also suggests the ability of the state to repress 
political demands reduces chances for social movements to influence the political 
domain.  These findings were later supported by Kriesi (1995) in a study of new social 
movements (NSM) in France, Germany, Netherlands and Switzerland.  Kriesi suggests 
the success of NSMs is dependent in large part on POS; specifically open democratic 
political structure, divided elites, and a unified Left. 
 Jenkins and Perrow (1977) found that the National Farm Labor Union (NFLU) 
and the United Farm Workers (UFW) experienced vastly different levels of success.  For 
the NFLU, the political environment was not at all supportive.  The group received little 
financial support, had very few political allies, and confronted strong partisan opposition 
in favor of agribusiness.  Whereas the UFW had steady a stream of financial and political 
support, fairly neutral political officials open and responsive to the group’s concerns, 
strong political allies in labor unions, and divided governmental elites.  Similarly, 
Jenkins, Jacobs, and Agnone (2003) in a study of Civil Rights protests between 1948 and 
1997 found that both frequency of Civil Rights protest and successful attainment of 
movement goals were more likely to occur when northern Democrats increased in 
political strength and Republican presidential incumbents experienced Cold War 
pressures.   
McCright and Clark (2006) take a broader view of POS by including state-
oriented institutionalized opportunities (i.e., presences of political parties and sympathetic 
elites) as well as noninstitutional aspects of localized political and social environments 
(i.e., presence or absence of other social movements) in an examination of local 
environmental movements in the Midwest.  The authors found non-institutional factors 
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better predictors of positive political outcomes than institutional factors and sympathetic 
allies were found to be more important to successful political outcomes than weak 
antagonists.  Meyer and Minkoff (2004) found that a consistent predictor of positive 
political outcomes within the Civil Rights movement (1955-1985) is whether or not a 
Democratic President is in office.  The authors suggest Democratic presidential 
administrations are more sympathetic to concerns of Civil Rights organizations and 
therefore open important POS.  These strong findings have led a number of researchers to 
conclude that in spite of strong mobilization (well funded, formalized SMOs, diverse 
coalitions, and many participants), the ultimate factor that influences whether a social 
movement successfully attains a given outcome is largely dependent on the socio-
political environment.  A major problem with POS, as discussed by a number of scholars 
(most notably Goodwin and Jasper 1999 and Polletta 1999), is it severely under-theorizes 
social4 and cultural components of exogenous environmental factors. 
 Another important factor in explaining social movement outcomes is the strength 
of prior organization, or indigenous social organization.  Much of this research is related 
to successful emergence and mobilization.  However, some researchers have suggested 
that successful social movement outcomes are more likely to occur where preexisting 
indigenous organization is strong.  Morris (1981) examination of 1960 sit-in movements 
found both black churches and colleges to be crucial to successful mobilization.  Within 
urban sociology, a number of research studies have found a strong relationship between 
successful political outcomes within land-use movements and high levels of socio-
                                                 
4
 Although it could be argued that “social opportunity structures” fall under broad categories such 
as indigenous social organization, mobilizing structures, and movement infrastructure, these 
areas have been studied much more thoroughly than cultural factors. 
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economic status (see Logan, Whaley, and Crowder 1997).  Preexisting indigenous 
organization not only offers important access to leadership, but it also helps with 
communication and recruitment (Snow et al 1980; Gould 1991; Passy 2001).  A similar 
finding by Stearns and Almeida (2004) in a study of anti-pollution efforts in Japan 
suggests that sympathetic elites are important, but more specifically, it is collaborative 
relationships with important state actors (political parties, local government, key court 
officials, and state-level agencies) that allow for positive political outcomes.   
 A number of scholars have commented that even together political opportunity 
structures and social organization do not capture the complexity of the environment that 
social movements operate within.  For example, Goldstone (2004) suggests that 
researchers need to account for political, economic, and social structure as well as 
political authorities, actors, and elites.  However, there are many other factors that are left 
out of the equation including cultural opportunities, other movements and 
countermovements, general public opinion, attitudes, values and norms, and critical 
events.   
Important theoretical advancements have been made over the last ten years with 
regards to cultural factors, however.  Specifically, the work by McCammon and 
colleagues (2001a, 2001b, 2007, 2008) has begun to uncover the role of cultural 
opportunities, “gendered opportunity structures,” as they relate to political outcomes.  
Essentially, the authors argue that political as well as social and cultural opportunities 
help or hinder successful outcomes.  McCammon, Campbell, Granberg, and Mowery 
(2001b) argue “shifting gender relations produced a gendered opportunity for women’s 
suffrage by altering attitudes among political decision-makers about the appropriate roles 
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of women in society” (51).  In other words, changes in the socio-cultural realm related to 
women’s political participation offered “gendered opportunity” for success in the 
political arena.  McCammon and Campbell (2001a) offer a similar argument in 
explaining the emergence, mobilization, and successful political outcomes of early 
women’s suffrage in thirteen western states.  A combination of political and gendered 
opportunities helped foster important gains within the political arena specifically passing 
women’s voting rights legislation prior to the enactment of the 19th amendment.  
Researchers have found the media to be an important environmental factor that 
may help or hinder the movement success (Gamson 1990; Molotch 1977).  Lipsky (1968) 
stated this quite succinctly: “If protest tactics are not considered significant by the media, 
or if newspapers and television reporters or editors decide to overlook protest tactics, 
protest organizations will not succeed” (1151).  Halebsky (2006) found that anti-
superstore movements were more successful at stopping the development of Wal-Mart 
Superstores when the media reflected favorably on the movement or came out against the 
zoning of the land to commercial. 
Another important factor is the role of public opinion.  Burstein (1999) suggests 
SMOs face great difficulties when it comes to influencing public policy because of the 
competition by an array of stakeholders vying for legislative attention.  The ability to 
influence public policy becomes even more complicated when SMO objectives conflict 
with majority interests.  The author does, however, suggest that SMOs can attain positive 
political outcomes when public opinion is ambiguous and by successfully linking SMO 
concerns to governmental officials and agencies.  In a meta-analysis of sociological and 
political science journals (1990-2000), Burstein and Linton (2002) found particular 
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credence in successful policy attainment by SMOs and their ability to link their concerns 
to concerns of elected officials during election cycles.  Furthermore, research analysis of 
policy outcomes show SMO impact is reduced significantly when public opinion is 
included.  To put it simply, social movements typically do not meet their objectives 
unless the public is supportive or indifferent.  Even in examples where there is clear 
evidence that social movements influence policy changes, it is usually the case that the 
impact was felt during the early stages of policy process (Soule and King 2006).  Social 
movement concerns tend to be overlooked in the later stages over concerns of public 
opinion.  Burstein (2006) does offer caution, however, not to overstate the impact of 
public opinion on policy outcomes.  This is due to selection bias by researchers, or 
choosing policy debates that are popular, and therefore governmental officials are more 
likely to be concerned with public opinion.   
Social movement research has also explored the role of countermovements in 
relation to mobilization and social movement outcomes (Meyer and Staggenborg 1996).  
Countermovements are “networks of individuals and organizations that share many of the 
same objects of concern as the social movements that they oppose…[but]…make 
competing claims on the state of matters of policy and politics and vie for attention from 
the mass media and broader public” (1996: 1632).  Interaction between movement and 
countermovement strongly influence and shape the political environment where “the 
opposing movements create ongoing opportunities and obstacles for one another” (1643).  
The relationship between movement and countermovement is one where the success of 
one side sparks the other side and so on, effectively prolonging the conflict.  However, 
without successes, neither movement nor countermovement can sustain mobilization and 
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will experience a decline (Meyer and Staggenborg 1996: 1647).  In short, social 
movements that experience countermovements are at a severe disadvantage for successful 
social movement outcomes, specifically within the political arena.  This was one of the 
major predictors of successful political outcomes among anti-superstore movements 
(Halebsky 2006).  Outcomes within the social and cultural arenas, however, are not as 
clear.  Although research would suggest at least with regards to cultural outcomes (e.g., 
collective identity as an outcome), social movement that experience countermovements 
may develop a stronger collective identity due to outside threats (Polletta and Jasper 
2001). 
COMBINATION OF SMO AND ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS 
 Although discussed separately, there are a number of research studies that use a 
combination of factors (both internal movement and environmental characteristics) that 
explore the effect on social movement outcomes.  For example, Burstein et al (1995) 
suggest that positive political outcomes are dependent on the interaction among “SMOs, 
their targets, and the political context” (284).  Andrews (2004) identifies the importance 
of preexisting leadership, social networks, and indigenous resources and organizations in 
building and improving movement infrastructure in order to positively impact political 
outcomes.  Cress and Snow (1996, 2000) found clear diagnostic and prognostic frames in 
combination with the viability of SMO important for political and social outcomes.  
Halebsky (2006) found successful outcomes positively associated with broadly framed 
threats, evidence of broad based support, and positive coverage of the movement by the 
media.  McVeigh, Welch, and Bjarnason (2003) found SMOs devoted to hate crime 
enforcement must rely on steady flow of resources and clear framing processes as well as 
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clearly show political incentive for elite support and capitalize on POS.  In a study of 
attempts by gay and lesbian activists to overturn state sodomy laws, Kane (2003) found a 
combination of SMO characteristics, POS, and socio-cultural context all impact the 
chances for positive political outcomes, but the importance of the joint effects of SMO 
characteristics and POS are the strongest indicator of political outcomes (i.e., activists 
experienced greater rates of success during high levels of mobilization and openings in 
POS).  McCammon and colleagues (2001a, 2001b, 2007, 2008) social movements must 
not only have the needed resources and emerge in favorable political, social, and cultural 
milieu, but social movement leaders, participants, and organization must actively view, 
adapt,  and engage the local context as it changes.   
 Two models that exemplify the interaction and combinatorial nature of internal 
movement characteristics and environmental context are Amenta and colleagues (1992, 
1994, 1996, 1999) political mediation model and Giugni’s (2007) joint effect model.  The 
political mediation model identifies the importance of internal movement characteristics 
and environmental factors on movement success or failure.  However, in this model, 
environmental factors, specifically POS, act as the mediating variable through which 
social movements succeed (1992).  More specifically, social movements must have 
strong organizations and function within a politically favorable context to succeed (1992, 
1994, 1996).  For example, in a study of Townsend Movement (elderly rights and 
pension movement) during the Great Depression, Amenta and Zylan (1991) found the 
movement was most successful in areas of the country where the Democratic Party was 
prominent but not in power.  Again, Amenta, Caruthers, and Zylan (1992) found the 
Townsend Movement was successful in areas where the social movement operated in a 
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sympathetic environment (i.e., political allies and elite connections).  More importantly, 
the authors found a relationship between changes in the strength of the Townsend 
Movement and congressional action.  Congressional action occurred, although slightly 
lagging behind peaks in mobilization.   
In a study of another early 20th century social movement, Amenta, Dunleavy, and 
Bernstein (1994) use the economic redistribution campaign of Huey Long’s “Share Our 
Wealth” (SOW) movement to demonstrate the model’s usefulness.  Using two other 
contemporary movements (Father Couglin’s National Union of Social Justice and the 
Townsend Movement) as comparators, the authors test the impact of SOW on the 
Roosevelt administration’s New Deal Policies.  The findings suggest SOW had more 
influence (and successes) than the other neopopulist movement, which the authors 
attribute to strength and extent of SOW mobilization.  However, the necessary condition 
for SOW success was the favorable political environment from which the movement 
operated; specifically, sympathetic Democratic elites and highly competitive and divided 
political parties.  Amenta, Caren, and Olasky (2005), more recently, applied the political 
mediation model to the Townsend Movement, this time controlling for public opinion.  
The authors still found strong evidence for the model. 
More recently, Giugni (2007) suggested a slightly modified version referred to 
joint effect model.  The difference is in distinguishing between whether the social and 
political context are the mediating factor between social movement mobilization and 
successful outcomes or whether social movement mobilization and the socio-political 
context acting jointly in determining success.  In a time-series analysis of the impact of 
three US movements (ecology, antinuclear, and peace movements), Giugni (2007) 
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examines the joint effect of either political allies, public opinion, or both with the internal 
characteristics of the social movement.   Giugni (2007) also suggests the importance of 
identifying the level of the targeted outcome (local, national, or transnational) and the 
likelihood of success (especially when it comes to policy change).  What he found was 
strong social movements must either have widespread public support or key political 
allies or both to successfully influence positive political outcomes.  In all three cases, the 
author found social movements have little to no impact on public policy unless they 
engage in disruptive protest to pursue viable claims (i.e., local versus transnational level 
policy outcomes), push issues that are either publicly favorable or reveal public 
indifference, and have widespread public support, connections to political elites, or both. 
In the following chapter, the SMO controlled variables and environmental 
variables identified from the literature are used to inform data analysis.  Operational 
definitions are provided and draw on existing literature that links internal movement 
characteristics, environmental factors, or both to specific arenas of outcomes. 
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CHAPTER IV 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
INTRODUCTION 
The objective of this research is to identify the organizational and environmental 
factors that help in the successful attainment of social movement outcomes by smart 
growth social movements.  By exploring three separate case studies of social movement 
emergence, mobilization, and influence, I have developed an exhaustive list of potential 
casual factors that influence social movement outcomes.   
SELECTING CASES 
The three cases used for this study are: (1) Ames Smart Growth Alliance (ASGA) 
in Ames, IA, (2) Brunswick Smart Growth (BSG) in Brunswick, NY, and (3) Citizens of 
Greater Centreville (CGC) in Centreville, MD (see Table 3). 
Table 3: Descriptive information 
Group Location  Population  Event  Date 
Ames Smart Growth Alliance (ASGA) Ames, IA  52319  Commercial  2002-Present 
Brunswick Smart Growth (BSG) Brunswick, NY 11696 Commercial 2005-Present 
Citizens for Greater Centreville (CGC) Centreville, MD  2662 Residential 2001-Present 
 
These three cases were selected for a list of 67 “smart growth” movements based on 
willingness to participate, geographical location, and mobilizing event (commercial, 
residential, or other).   
More specifically, selection of these three cases was completed as follows.  First, 
ASG was the first case selected.  Originally, the research design included ten cases with 
three separate tiers.  The three tiers indicated difference in methodologies employed 
during the data collection procedure as well as the amount time spent in the field at each 
case study location.  ASG was to act as the sole case in the first tier of the research design 
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helping inform inductively (and theoretically) derived hypotheses to test in the second 
and third tier cases.   
As for second tier cases, first, a list of 66 SMOs was compiled by identifying 
organizations that subscribe to smart growth principles and have at least the 
organizational structure of a website.  Key words used in search queries included “smart 
growth,” “responsible growth,” “concerned citizens,” “citizen participation,” and “land-
use planning.”  Second, of the 66 SMOs, 54 of the 66 organization’s website were 
researched and contacted via email expressing interest in the organization, movement, 
mobilizing issue, and the community.  Of the 55 contacted, 31 responded, and 22 (out of 
31 that responded) were interviewed either by email or phone depending on preference 
(see Appendix A).  Ten cases were originally chosen from the list of 66 SMOs (see Table 
4). 
Table 4. Original SMO Selections 
 Group Location  Population  Event  
Central 
Case:  
 
1.    Smart Growth Alliance 1. Ames, IA  46500  Commercial  
2nd Tier 
Cases:  
2.    Citizens for Effective Communities 
3.    Our Community First 
4.    Smart Growth Group 
5.    Citizens for Centreville 
6.    Citizens for Responsible Growth 
 
2. Chatham County, NC  
3. Bend, OR  
4. Brunswick, NY  
5. Centreville, MD  
6. Riviera Beach, FL  
49329 * 
52029 
11600 
2662 
26658  
Residential 
Commercial 
Commercial 
Residential  
Condominium  
3rd Tier 
Cases:  
7.    Concerned Citizens of Ballston 
8.    Citizens for Smart Growth 
9.    Citizens for Responsible Growth 
10.  Fortuna First 
  
7. Ballston, NY  
8. Knox County, OH  
9. Beaumont, CA  
10. Fortuna, CA 
5586 
54500 * 
11384 
8991 
Commercial 
Residential 
Residential 
Commercial 
*Indicates county level data 
 
The ten cases were reduced to three for a number of reasons including practicality 
in terms of time, money and scope.  After deciding to narrow the number of cases down 
to three, the three tier research design was no longer applicable and county level 
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organizations were removed from contention.  The two other cases were selected on the 
basis of willingness to participate, mobilizing event (residential and commercial), size of 
community, geographical location, and cost of travel.  The case selections were 
determined by attempts to vary answers to the initial six interview questions.   
DEFINING CASES 
  The use of the case study approach is particularly useful in explaining the 
emergence, mobilization, and outcomes of social movement activity (Ragin 1987).  Case 
studies are constructed to provide a narrative of what transpired within each community, 
how the group organized, and what the result of the collective mobilization was.  Each 
case traces the development of social movement activity, the main actors and 
organizations, the tactics and strategies, the social, political, and cultural context, and the 
outcomes targeted as well as achieved.  Multiple cases are used to identify common 
themes and patterns.  A case is defined as a group of citizens who mobilize in response to 
a localized contentious land-use issue and who adopt smart growth principles as part of 
their mobilizing philosophy.   
DATA COLLECTION PROCEDURE 
Data come from a triangulation of methodologies including (1) participant 
observation of movement-related events and activities, (2) in-depth interviews with key 
stakeholders, and (3) content analysis of media coverage, city documents, and 
organizational literature.  Each one of the three cases involved the exact same data 
collection procedure.  However, the length of time and the amount of data collected 
differed.  For participant observations, fieldnotes were taken and transcribed, and 
corresponding memos were written.  Memos acted as reflections not only on the 
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observations and interviews but also help relate the data collected within and across cases 
and are used to draw on existing social movement theories. For ASGA, I observed the 
group on numerous occasions (over 35 hours) from June 2005 to February 2007 at 
general meetings, executive board meetings, no new mall subcommittee meetings, city 
council meetings, protests and rallies, and SMO sponsored events.  For both BSG and 
CGC, I had conducted an extensive three day field visit to each location (August 2007 for 
BSG and November 2007 for CGC).  During the field visit, I met with key stakeholders 
for each group, toured the local community, and visited development site locations. 
For each of three cases, a content analysis of organizational literature, media 
coverage, and governmental records are used to develop the movements contextual 
narrative creating a historical timeline of events, actions, and outcomes.  Archival and 
historical data are also used to compare stories covered in the newspaper with the stories 
described by social movement participants.  For ASGA, every newspaper account, every 
city and legal document, all organizational literature (SMO and counter-SMO) created 
between 2002 and 2008, SMO financial records, membership lists and internal 
correspondence from SMO were compiled and analyzed.  For BSG, the majority of 
letters to the editor, key newspaper articles, all organizational literature (since February 
2005), and all city and legal documents were compiled and analyzed.  For CGC, key 
letters to the editor and newspaper articles, all organizational literature (since April 
2003), video of key public meetings, and all city and legal documents were also compiled 
and analyzed.  
Finally, in depth, semi-structured interviews were conducted with stakeholders 
from each group.  Participants were asked the same set of 16 questions regarding three 
40 
 
 
 
areas: personal involvement, internal organization operations, and local environmental 
context.  A purposive sampling technique was used to identify key organizers from each 
SMO, specifically individuals in leadership positions.  After interviewing key 
stakeholders, a snowball sampling technique was administered to contact other social 
movement actors.  Interview length ranged from twenty minutes just under two hours.  
The interviews averaged between 30-40 minutes.  A total of 24 interviews were 
conducted.  Eight of the interviews were conducted in person.  The remaining 16 were 
conducted over the telephone.  Nine from ASGA (five female, four male), nine from 
BSG (four female, five male), and six from CGC (zero female, six male).  The 
participants held an array of occupations including: PhD holders (8) from diverse fields 
such as economics, accounting, math, environmental science, psychology, and 
communications; professionals including business, law, engineering, education, and 
military (9); small business owners (2); stay at home mothers (2); farmers (2); and artist 
(1).  Overall, all of the participants interviewed had high levels of education.  
FUNDING DISCLOSURE AND RESEARCH APPROVAL 
A small grant from the Midwest Sociological Society helped fund travel to both 
Brunswick, New York and Centreville, Maryland for extensive field visits.  Funding was 
also used to finance part of the transcribing of interviews.  Human Subjects approval was 
granted by the Institutional Review Board at Iowa State University November 2006 and 
reapproval was granted November 2007. 
OPERATIONAL DEFINITIONS 
To organize and analyze the data, Ragin’s (1987) Qualitative Comparative 
Analysis (QCA) is used.  QCA is an inductive, quasi-experimental approach, which relies 
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on the use of Boolean algebraic logic for small-N comparisons.  This method is derived 
from John Stuart Mill’s attempts to establish empirical generalizations from inductive, 
case-oriented research.  QCA requires the identification of all possible causal conditions 
(IV) as well as outcome properties (DV).  In each case, the researcher must identify either 
the absence or presence of each factor.  By comparing multiple cases, the researcher can 
identify similar combinations of causal conditions and can remove different, and 
therefore irrelevant factors essentially simplifying complex social phenomenon.  Falling 
in line with social movement research on social movement outcomes, a list of 
theoretically and inductively derived causal variables are separated into SMO-controlled 
and environmental factors.  All independent variables and operationalizations are listed in 
Table 5. 
There are four SMO-controlled variables including organizational viability 
(VIABLE), tactics and strategies (TACTICS), high levels of participation (HIGH PART), 
and clearly defined diagnostic and prognostic frames (FRAMES).  There are eight 
environmental factors including political opportunity structures as defined by 
experiencing some form of crisis, relative openness of institutionalized political system, 
sympathetic elite allies, state level smart growth policies (POS), indigenous organization 
(INDIG), media favorable toward development (MEDIA), and public opinion favorable 
toward development (PUBLIC) (see Table 5).   
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Table 5. Causal Conditions 
SMO Factors Environmental Factors 
A = VIABLE  
(Adopted from 
Cress and Snow 
2000)  
 
 
1 – SMO-existed for one year or 
more 
2 – Regular meetings at least once a 
month 
3 – Ongoing campaigns 
4 – Incorporated 
5 – Clear leadership 
6 – Committees or sub-committees 
7 – Raised more than $5000 
8 – Diverse range of professional 
occupations 
9 – Committed core of 5 or more 
individuals 
 
A = POS 1 – Crisis such as rapid development 
pressures or environmental degradation. 
2 – Open political system such as non-
partisan opposition, responsive elected 
officials to social movement concerns, 
or little to no evidence of support for 
real estate interests 
3 – At least one sympathetic elected or 
appointed official in this position before 
the group emerged (i.e., speaking 
publicly in support of smart growth or 
attending SMO meetings) 
4 – Evidence of support within the 
business community 
5 – State adopted smart growth policies 
 
B = TACTICS 1 – Disruptive or innovative tactics 
such as the intentional use of tactics 
to disrupt land-use process 
2 – Political tactics such as rallies, 
petitions, lobbying, or speaking at 
meetings 
3 – Legal tactic such as hiring lawyer 
or file suit against city 
 
B = INDIG 1 – Leadership from other land-use 
issues 
2 – Established organization in place 
that helped movement 
3 – Other movement activity in the area 
such as environmental and/or labor 
groups 
4 – Close proximity to university 
5 – Evidence of high bridging and 
bonding capital (i.e., community is 
accepting of a diversity of opinions and 
evidence of horizontal decision making 
regarding land-use issues) 
 
C = HIGH 
PART  
(Part of measure 
adopted from 
Halebsky 2001, 
2006) 
 
1 – More than 50 people at one or 
more SMO sponsored event 
2 – More than 50 people at one or 
more city meeting 
3 – More than 30 letters to the editor 
in a given calendar year 
4 – Petition with more than 400 
signatures 
5 – Active attempts at ongoing 
recruitment 
 
C = MEDIA 1 – Evidence of support for development 
such as editorials in support of 
development, favorable coverage of the 
contentious land-use issue, or 
unfavorable coverage of SMO 
D = FRAMES 
(Adopted from 
Cress and Snow 
2000) 
 
1 – Clearly defined problem and 
who/what is to blame 
2 – Use of diagnostic frame(s) by 
individuals or organizations not 
involved in the movement 
3 – Clearly define solutions to the 
problem 
4 – Use of prognostic frame(s) by 
individuals or organizations not 
involved in the movement 
 
D = PUBLIC 1 – Evidence of support for 
development such as letters to editor, 
formal opinion polls, petitions, or 
election outcomes 
2 – Countermovement emerged in 
response to smart growth movement 
 
 
If all indicators are satisfied, then the causal condition is present and is coded “1” 
except for POS where meeting four of the five indicators are required to be coded 
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present.  If a causal condition has not been identified, or is absent, it is coded “0.”    
Similarly to causal variables, a list of theoretically and inductively derived outcome 
properties (dependent variables) is displayed for each of outcomes.  These outcome 
variables are provided in Table 6. 
Table 6. Outcome Properties 
Political Outcomes Social Outcomes Cultural Outcomes 
X = POLICY 1 – Changes to 
comprehensive 
plan; 
2 – Changes to 
development 
plans; OR 
3 – Enact smart 
growth initiative or 
an initiative that 
aligns with smart 
growth principles 
4 – Open call for 
public input on 
subsequent 
development 
proposals 
5 – Make land-use 
issues more 
accessible to 
general public 
 
Z = SOCIAL 1 – 
Interorganizational 
cooperation with 
existing 
organization(s) 
2 – New groups 
emerge that are 
supportive of 
smart growth 
principles 
3 – Smart growth 
leadership in other 
community 
leadership 
positions 
 
Z = IDENTITY 1 – Evidence 
participants 
have adopted 
“smart growth” 
or “empowered 
citizen” identity 
2 – Evidence 
participation in 
the movement 
has shaped how 
others see them 
Y=REPRESENT 
(Gamson 1990; 
Cress and Snow 
2000) 
 
 
 
1 – At least one 
official 
elected/appointed 
after movement 
emerged and who 
publicly supported 
SMO cause 
 
 
   
Z = STOP 1 – Stop 
development 
 
    
 
Variable names and operational definitions are offered for each outcome property.  There 
are four political outcomes identified including political policy or process change 
(POLICY), representation (REPRESENT), and stop development (STOP).  There is one 
social outcome: changes in social capital (SOCIAL).  Finally, there is one cultural 
outcome: collective identity (IDENTITY).  For each of the outcome properties, all of the 
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measures needed to be present to be marked as present (“1”) with the sole exception of 
POLICY, which requires at least two of the first three indicators plus four and five 
satisfied to be considered present.  Again, if the outcome is absent, it is coded as “0.” 
As an important side note, it should be cautioned that the research findings from 
this project are limited regarding empirical generalizations.  Even when using QCA, 
researchers typically incorporate a larger sample size than three.  Despite the small 
number of cases, the use of QCA is still warranted and useful.  First, this method of 
analysis has been used by a number of social movement researchers over the last fifteen 
years when studying social movement outcomes.  As a result, there is a solid foundation 
of social movement research, which has helped establish this program of study.  Second, 
a number of social movement scholars have noted the level of complexity involved in 
analyzing social movement outcomes.  QCA is an appropriate method of organization 
and analysis for social movement outcomes because it lends itself to including multiple 
measures for both the cause and effect as well as accounting for change over time.  QCA 
as a method of analysis can be used to resolve all of these issues.  Finally, as is the case 
with most sociological research, QCA is well-suited for finding multiple paths to the 
same outcome.  In the study of social movement outcomes, research has shown that there 
are a number of paths that can lead to successful outcomes. 
The next three chapters explore three land-use movements that mobilized in 
response to contentious land-use decisions.  Each one of the case studies are analyzed 
using QCA.  Key variables identified as either part of SMO controlled factors, 
environmental factors, and outcome properties are inserted into each of case study 
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signifying the presence (or absence if noted) of the variable.  When discussed, variables 
are identified by placing their abbreviations in parentheses. 
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CHAPTER V 
AMES, IOWA: AMES SMART GROWTH ALLIANCE 
Late in 2000, an out of state developer made his first visit to Ames, Iowa to scout 
320 acres of land just outside the northeast corner of the city for a new commercial 
development5.  In 2002, the developer formally submitted a letter expressing interest in 
developing a new mall and met with key city officials making it public knowledge.  
There were a number of political and legal steps the developer and the city needed to take 
before the development could come to fruition (e.g., amending the city’s land use policy 
plan, voluntary annexation of land for the proposed site, and numerous impact studies 
related to market, traffic and growth).  The first sign of opposition appeared in 2002 
when two early smart growth proponents and later key founders of ASGA were quoted in 
the local newspaper speaking out against the project stating environmental issues and 
poor city planning.  One of the members was a local county commissioner of the soil and 
water conservation district and key organizer of Friends of Hallett’s Quarry6 and the 
other the co-founder of a group called the Quality of Life Network7 and a participant in 
both the 1997 Land Use Policy Plan (LUPP) and Vision Ames 2002 (INDIG).  Shortly 
after, local Iowa State University economist and retail sales expert, Ken Stone, formally 
                                                 
5
 Originally, the development was proposed as a 750,000 square foot enclosed mall with four 
anchor stores.  The project is currently divided into two parcels of land: a 640,000 square foot 
“Lifestyle Center” or an open air strip mall and a “Power Center” or Big Box retailers. 
6
 The group, Friends of Hallett’s Quarry, was formed during the fall of 1999 when a local 
developer proposed a large residential development around an old sand and gravel quarry.  The 
group was successful at forcing the city to annex the land and eventually was asked by the city to 
lead a campaign for a bond issue to raise money to purchase the land and develop a public park, 
now referred to as Ada Hayden Park. 
7
 The Quality of Life Network organized as a way to be formally recognized by the city and to offer 
input to the Land-Use Policy Plan during the mid-1990s; in particular, the group was opposed to 
the composition of the city’s task force and the lack of environmental perspective by committee 
members.  The group was successful at getting a local naturalist to serve on the task force. 
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presented to the city council retail sales statistics and future projections, which cast 
serious doubt as to the viability of building a second mall and the threat it would pose to 
nearby towns, the downtown, and the existing mall (POS) (Grebe 2002).   
Ames is a town of just over 50,000 with roughly half of the population coming 
from the student body of Iowa State University.  Ames is located just over thirty miles 
north of Des Moines, Iowa.  The community is very isolated from other metropolitan 
areas and is the largest city in Story County.  The median family income for the city is 
just over $56,000.  The two largest employers are public organizations, Iowa State 
University (INDIG) and Iowa Department of Transportation.  Ames has a number of 
commercial areas including an existing mall, a commercial district with Big Box retailers 
and restaurants, a downtown area made up of various niche shops, restaurants, and bars, 
and Campus Town, which is comprised mostly of restaurants, bars, and retail for 
university students.   
Although contentious from the moment the new mall plans became public, 
substantial opposition did not begin to mount until February of 2003.  It was at this point 
a new formed group, ASGA8, and 1000 Friends of Iowa (INDIG), a state level 
organization against sprawl and for sustainable development practices, began a petition 
drive opposing a change to the city’s LUPP (TACTICS).  A change to the LUPP was 
required to clear the way for the next steps in constructing the new mall.  By July 2003, 
the petition drive had over 1500 signatures from local residents.  In November of the 
same year, hundreds of yard signs stating “Smart Growth: No New Mall” started showing 
                                                 
8
 Originally, ASGA was called the Ames Smart Growth Committee, then Ames Smart Growth, and 
finally incorporated in 2006 as the Ames Smart Growth Alliance. 
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up around town, and the petition drive resulted in more than 2500 signatures from Ames 
residents (HIGH PART) (Anderson 2003).  At numerous points during 2003, the owners 
of the existing mall announced plans for expansion and spoke out publically against the 
proposed mall (POS); on many occasions the owners stated they supported a “smart 
growth approach” to development (Krapfl 2003).  
Early on, a number of prominent groups and individuals came out in favor of 
building a new mall including the local chamber of commerce and economic 
development commission.  In a survey of local business conducted by the chamber of 
commerce, it was reported seventy percent were in favor of a new mall (PUBLIC).  In a 
number of articles, the local newspaper also touted the economic benefits of building a 
new mall, discussed some of the developer’s past and present developments, and reported 
on pressure from two nearby towns and their attempts to attract the developer and the 
new mall (MEDIA).  Despite the local newspaper’s pro-mall stance, ASGA, its 
leadership, and smart growth supporters found a voice in the local newspaper from 
articles related to ASGA’s political and legal tactics and input on the land-use issues to 
guest editorials on smart growth and letters to the editor.  Also, one columnist from the 
newspaper wrote a number of tongue and cheek editorials about the mall such as “Putting 
Lipstick on a Pig,” “The Smart Growth Menace,” and “Deadlines? What Deadlines.”  In 
addition, from early on smart growth supporters found allies in parts of the business 
community (namely the existing mall) and within the ranks of city government (POS). 
In December 2003, the developer submitted an application to change the city’s 
LUPP to city staff, which was then recommended to the city Planning and Zoning 
Commission (PNZ).  The PNZ voted against (5 to 2) the developer’s proposal denying 
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the request for a map change and suggested the removal of the regional commercial site 
option from the 1997 LUPP (POS).  Despite the recommendation to deny the map change 
by the PNZ, the city council voted January of 2004 in favor of (4 to 2) changing the map 
allowing the developer to move ahead in the process.  At the meeting, nearly 100 people 
spoke during the public forum with the vast majority of the speakers opposed to the mall 
and the map change (HIGH PART).  A number of those who spoke in favor of the map 
change included a local developer, a future city council member and PNZ member, and 
the owner of natural gas company who would supply power to the development site.  
Those who spoke in opposition to the development included members of ASGA and 
1000 Friends of Iowa, the general manager of the existing mall, a member of the County 
Conservation Board, a representative of a housing association adjacent to the existing 
mall, and the co-president of the local League of Women Voters (INDIG) (Anderson 
2004a). 
A couple of weeks prior to the vote, the local newspaper hired an independent 
research company to conduct an opinion poll regarding the mall.  Of the 402 randomly 
sampled participants, 50 percent (n=201) of the respondents were opposed, 35 percent 
(n=141) were in favor, and 15 percent (n=60) undecided.  Three days prior to the vote, 
ASGA sponsored a smart growth symposium that attracted more than 100 participants 
focused on integrated urban growth (HIGH PART).  In March of 2004, following the city 
council’s vote to change the land-use map, 1000 Friends of Iowa pulled out of local city 
affairs  (Anderson 2004b).  Because of the level of public outcry against the 
development, this same month, the city decided to pursue a new zoning option, Gateway 
Overlay Zoning District (GOZD), which would make the commercial development 
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subject to more city oversight, stricter regulations, and broader public input (POLICY) 
(Anderson 2004c).  In six input sessions from May to August 2004, Ames residents 
helped establish guidelines for regulating the proposed development9 (POLICY).  The 
next step in the process was for the city to annex part of the proposed land in question.  
The annexation of proposed land and talk of changing its classification from agriculture 
to commercial fueled speculation that the move was simply a step to open up future 
development to local developers.  The first attempt by the city council to pass the land 
annexation drew a protest of over 100 local citizens outside of city hall (HIGH PART).  
The vote was delayed until the end of May 2004 when the city council unanimously 
voted to annex the land10 (Anderson 2004d). 
A battle over the financial impact the new mall would have on the local economy 
also emerged during this time (POS).  The mall’s developer had issued a market 
feasibility study which touted the new malls ability to stymie leakage of retail dollars out 
of the Ames market, draw in consumers from outside the city and meet a growing 
demand for greater retail options.  The report did discuss the negative impact the new 
mall would have on the existing mall (namely relocation of anchor stores to the new 
mall).  The report down played the impact of the power center on existing big box retail 
in town and from the surrounding areas and stated only “minimal impact” on the 
downtown.  The report was countered by a study paid for by the ownership group of the 
                                                 
9
 It should be noted that the leadership of ASGA was extremely unhappy with this process.  Many 
felt that the public input session was just paying lip-service to the political process and citizen 
involvement.  Furthermore, the purpose the sessions was to help set guidelines for the 
development.  Many members of the community were still strongly opposed to the development 
and were working hard to stop it because the change to the land-use map was only one step in 
many that need to be completed. 
10
 Despite two of the six city council members being against the mall, the land annexation still 
passed with a unanimous decision because the land annexation was seen as a good planning 
move. 
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existing mall.  The focus of the report was on the adverse effect the new mall would have 
on existing businesses in and around town (specifically the existing mall).  In addition, 
the report attempted to show despite the existing mall’s “physically dated” status, it was 
still performing at above the average sales-per-square-foot ratios.  In addition, retail 
expert Ken Stone, on a number of occasions discussed the viability of the new mall and 
offered scathing critique of the market feasibility study conducted by the developer of the 
new mall stating the report uses old data and grossly overestimates sales projections 
(Peterson 2004; Stone 2004).  A core member of ASGA with expertise in this area 
offered further critique of the developer’s study citing the cost of new infrastructure to 
taxpayers and further uncovering the discrepancies in the developer’s sales projections. 
In September of 2004 after concerns over lack of responsiveness from city 
officials (i.e., voting in favor of land-use map change, annexing land, and moving ahead 
with GOZD committee meetings despite growing opposition to the project), a political 
action committee, Ames Citizens for Better Local Government (ACBLG), was formed to 
influence city elections (SOCIAL) (TACTICS).  In October of 2004, the developer filed a 
rezoning request to change the land-use classification from agriculture industrial to 
commercial.  In February 2005, the final reading of the design ordinance, which was in 
part the result of citizen input on GOZD, passed 5 to 1 by city council.  The impact of 
smart growth supporters could be seen in a couple of concessions, albeit small, related to 
protecting the adjacent marsh, bulking up energy conservation standards, and limiting 
lighting and signage (POLICY).  Despite these small concessions, a group of six area 
residents, Advocates for Responsible Urban Design (ARUD) (SOCIAL), under 
advisement from legal counsel sent a letter to the city identifying problems with design 
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standard guidelines (i.e., lack of specified territory that design standards apply, lack of 
conformity to city’s comprehensive plan, a violation of Iowa law and proper city council 
procedures) (TACTICS).  This same month the developer submitted a proposal for a 
zoning agreement11. 
During the summer of 2005, the first signs of opposition to smart growth and 
unified pro-mall front emerged (PUBLIC).  Opposition picked up, mostly in the form of 
letters to the editor and comments posted online, when the former ASGA chairperson 
announced his intention of running for city council.  Shortly after the announcement, two 
other smart growth candidates announced their candidacy.  The first to announce was a 
fringe member of ASGA and a former member of the planning and zoning commission.  
The other smart growth candidate made his announcement and came from the ranks of 
the local University.  All three smart growth candidates faced pro-mall challengers (two 
of whom were sitting incumbents and one who was running for a vacant seat)12.   
It was around this same time that attacks on the credibility of the smart growth 
movement by pro-growth supporters started.  Mostly found in letters to the editor and 
online comments, pro-growth supporters attempted to frame the group as a “vocal 
minority,” “elitist,” “special interests,” and “against progress.”  Although there is ample 
evidence of pro-growth supporters framing smart growth supporters as such, this was no 
evidence that this was something that caught on within the local media nor was there 
strong evidence of this within city government.  Additionally, out of the nine in-depth 
                                                 
11
 The zoning agreement deals with such things as proof of financing and leases by tenants as 
well as timeline for construction 
12
 During the 2005 election cycle, smart growth candidates outraised the pro-mall candidates by 
almost 2 to 1 ($14,834 to $8,631).  The former chairperson of ASGA raised roughly half of the 
total contributions collected by smart growth candidates. 
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interviews with smart growth organizers, four of them stated they felt their involvement 
with ASGA has influenced how others in the community see them.  However, when 
probed on how their involvement changed how others view them, the results were mixed 
ranging from making enemies within the community to gaining respect from others.  
Also, four of the nine interviewees stated that they felt their involvement in the 
movement has changed how they view themselves.  The four who stated their 
involvement has changed how they view themselves explained that they felt empowered 
as a citizen and felt that they were a part of something important.  Although there is some 
evidence of attempt to both impose an identity on smart growth members as well as weak 
evidence of a smart growth and an empowered citizen identity, the majority of the 
respondents still stated they did not feel their involvement changed how other view them 
nor did it change how they view themselves. 
In September 2005, the city council attempted to pass the first of three readings of 
the rezoning and zoning agreements.  The meeting was met with a rally and protest (over 
80 protesters) outside city hall and packed city council chambers (more than 100 people 
attended the meeting) (HIGH PART).  The first attempt fell short, however, because an 
adjacent landowner to the proposed land filed an official protest13 with the city thereby 
forcing the developer to renegotiate the land purchasing agreement (TACTICS).   
After renegotiating the land purchasing agreement to overcome the protest, the 
city council rescheduled the first of three readings for election night (Raasch 2005a).  The 
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 The official protest stated that the adjacent landowner owned more than 20 percent of the land 
within 200 feet of the land that was up for rezoning.  A supermajority (five of the six city council 
members) was required to overturn the protest. 
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city council voted and passed 4-2 the first reading of both the rezoning agreement14 and 
later the zoning agreement.  The vote took place after two hours of public input where 
seventeen citizens spoke (16 in opposition and 1 in favor).  Over 100 citizens were in 
attendance with most being in opposition to the mall; this was based on the applause and 
cheers to dissenting votes and the sighs when consenting votes were cast (HIGH PART).  
The sixteen smart growth advocates spoke on many different issues.  One common 
concern, however, was that the council table the vote until after the election.  The 
outcome of the election was overwhelmingly in favor of the smart growth candidates.  
The former ASGA chairperson won with 56 percent of the votes to the pro-mall 
incumbents 44 percent.  In the competition for the vacant council seat, the smart growth 
candidate received 59 percent to the pro-mall candidates 41 percent.  The third smart 
growth candidate received 14 votes shy of gaining the majority in a three way race.  This 
forced a runoff election where the student challenger won with 57.6 percent of the vote to 
the incumbents 42.2 percent (REPRESENT).  The final reading for both the rezoning and 
zoning agreements was passed in December.  This same month Dillard’s Department 
store became the first store to commit to the mall (Raasch 2005b). 
In January 2006, the new city council took office (now 4-2 smart growth 
majority).  This same month ARUD filed a lawsuit against the city stating the vote on 
election night broke “state and local laws before passing an ordinance that rezoned land 
for the shopping center,” and “contends that the council unlawfully changed the rezoning 
agreement during a public hearing and failed to collect signatures from owners of the 
                                                 
14
 The purpose of the rezoning agreement is to change the land-use designation from agricultural-
industrial to commercial. 
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land in question” (TACTICS).  With the new composition of the city council favoring the 
smart growth supporters, the new city council began the process of rescinding the 
rezoning and zoning agreements.  Without a supermajority, the council could not 
overturn the ordinance outright, so other tactics were employed including sending the 
new ordinance back to the PNZ, changing the land designation back to agriculture, and 
suspending the ordinance indefinitely.   
With the filing of the lawsuit by ARUD, the out-of-state developer and the owners 
of the 320 acres of land joined the city in defense of the rezoning agreement.  It was also 
during this time that the out-of-state developer announced he was investing $40,000 into 
a local public relations firm.  Although never explicitly stated by either the developer or 
the public relations firm, it was during this time that a “citizen’s group” called 
YesProgress emerged.  YesProgress conducted a city wide mailing of pamphlets stating 
the benefits of building a new mall.  The group also held a petition drive and sent out 
YesProgress yard signs.  The citizen group’s main spokesperson was an employee of the 
public relations firm and one of the main organizers was a member of the planning and 
zoning commission (PUBLIC).   
With the new city council moving to rescind the land-use change, the out-of-state 
developer and the landowners filed a “defensive” lawsuit against the city.  Finally, as the 
new city council members took office, the major economic development groups became 
much more visible as well as vocal proponents of the mall.  In a joint letter, the Chamber 
of Commerce, the Economic Development Commission, the HomeBuilders Association, 
and the Young Professionals, urged the city council to “end the debate over the proposed 
mall” meaning “letting a new mall move forward.”  Additionally, more and more pro-
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growth supporters started attending city council meetings and writing letters to the editor.  
This was exemplified by a crucial city council meeting in May of 2006 where the smart 
growth council voted to table the mall issue indefinitely.  At this meeting over 300 
residents attended, many of whom were wearing YesProgress buttons.  The majority of 
the speakers during public forum spoke in opposition to the vote or in favor of the mall 
(PUBLIC).  At the meeting, the city council voted 4 to 2 to postpone indefinitely zoning 
for the land15. 
With smart growth supporters seemingly having the upper hand, a major blow 
was dealt to anti-mall proponents.  Stating concerns over ethical tactics, one of smart 
growth city council members decided to not continue to vote in favor of indefinitely 
suspending the land-use designation.  This changed the required majority (4-2) to a split 
(3-3) city council.  As a result, the vote would be overturned and the mall would be 
allowed to move forward.  In an attempt to force some sort of compromise, the former 
ASGA chairperson and new city council member wrote a letter stating his willingness to 
allow the mall to move forward under the following conditions: (1) designate land east of 
the development to industrial use and to specifically target bio-based technology and 
energy production; (2) have the developer commit to an environmental buffer to the 
north; (3) secure additional monies from the developer to offset infrastructure costs 
related to bus, bike, and pedestrian traffic; (4) develop a welcome center that provided 
information about the city in an attempt to connect the mall with the existing community; 
and (5) a commitment to a tax increment financing district by the city to use a portion of 
                                                 
15
 The postponement was passed to wait for a judge’s ruling on the whether or not a 
supermajority was required to overturn unpublished ordinances.   
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the expected increased tax revenue for specific revitalization projects in downtown, 
Campustown, community facilities, and industrial development opportunities.  This move 
caused major turmoil within ASGA leadership and eventually led to the reconfiguration 
of city council members who supported smart growth issues. 
Following the compromise a pro-mall city council member stepped down from 
his post and was temporarily replaced by the mayor until a November 2006 special 
election.  A member of the PNZ and a supporter of the mall and another major organizer 
of ASGA were the respective candidates for this open city council seat.  The theme of the 
smart growth candidate was sustainable development and community consensus.  From 
June to November 2006, the mall issue was fairly quiet.  However, the special election 
filled in the void.  The pro-mall candidate won the election by a margin of 62 percent to 
37 percent (PUBLIC).  The pro-mall candidate raised $11,290 to the smart growth 
candidate’s $8,837.  According to the Iowa Ethics and Campaign Disclosure Board, a 
number of local developers, an influential businessperson16, pro-mall PNZ members, the 
former pro-mall mayor, and Republican candidates for county and state positions 
contributed to the pro-mall candidate.  In December, the mall master plan was approved 
by the PNZ and then on to the city council where it was approved. 
At the beginning of 2007, the city council invited a number of local interest 
groups to participate in a series of six forums on growth.  The forums were led by local 
Iowa State University professors, a board member of ASGA, the executive director of the 
Chamber of Commerce and Economic Development Commission, the local 
                                                 
16
 Nearly a year early, this local business person had paid for a number of billboard and 
newspaper advertisements  
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Superintendent of Ames Community School District, and a representative from the local 
Hospital, and moderated by an editor of the local newspaper (SOCIAL).  The forums 
were open to Ames residents and were an attempt to bring differing opinions to the table 
and to help build community consensus (POLICY). 
In May 2007, the city council identified establishing Ames as a environmentally 
sustainable community by signing the US Mayor’s Climate Protection Act and therefore 
dedicated the city to “EcoSmart” programs such as meeting LEED building standards, 
upgrading the city owned electrical power plant to increase efficiency, buying city owned 
hybrid vehicles, and promoting energy and water conservation (POLICY).  More 
controversy emerged with the blocking of the mayor’s appointee for the vacant PNZ spot.  
The appointee was an outspoken advocate for large scale economic growth initiatives.  
Further concerns were raised because a number of the other applicants who were 
overlooked by the mayor either had ties to ASGA, had spoke passionately about 
sustainability and energy efficiency, or had spoke critically about sprawl.  The original 
nominee was never appointed. 
In August 2007, the developer released site plans for the eastern part of the 
commercial development (135 of 320 acres), which included two major anchor stores and 
space for a movie theater.  Site plans for the mall were approved by city council (5-1).  
The following November another election became largely defined by the unresolved 
mall.  One smart growth incumbent was challenged by a pro-mall supporter, and one pro-
mall incumbent was challenged by a smart growth candidate.  Both incumbents were 
reelected by narrow margins.  The pro-mall incumbent won with 54 percent of the vote 
and the smart growth incumbent won with 51 percent (PUBLIC).  The developer was 
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also approaching another deadline regarding the development agreement, which required 
the acquisition of 287 of the 320 acres, proof of financing for the project, and proof of 
leasing agreements with potential tenants.  Although all three of these requirements were 
eventually met, there were problems with all three17.  Smart growth proponents urged city 
council to cancel the developer’s agreement on grounds the developer was not meeting 
the requirements by the city.  The developer blamed his lack of progress on delays due to 
the drawn out process of receiving site plan approval.  In late December 2007, ARUD 
suit was dismissed. 
Over the next two months ARUD attempted to acquire through Iowa’s Open 
Records Law the lease agreement information provided by the developer.  However, in 
each case they were denied.  To date, this information has not been made public.  In 
February 2008, ASGA requested $17,000 from the city to help develop a sustainability 
plan for the community.  The request was the result of other pro-mall groups (e.g., the 
chamber of commerce and economic development group) receiving public financing 
from the city to employ various economic development strategies within Ames.  ASGA’s 
request was denied, but it led the city council to appropriate $20,000 for sustainability 
research and community education on global warming (POLICY).  From January to May 
2008, ASGA was formally invited by the city to partake in discussions of future growth 
and annexation strategies (SOCIAL).   
Currently the mall sits where it did in December of 2007.  Besides the 
correspondence between the city and the developer over off-site infrastructure 
                                                 
17
 The third requirement, proof of lease agreements, was the most problematic because the 
developer provided one actual lease agreement, 22 letters of intent, and 16 proposed lease 
agreements. 
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improvement construction plans, the city attorney has still not received additional lease 
agreements.  The developer has stated publicly that he remains committed to the project 
but has attributed the lack of progress to the downturn in the economy.  Rumors have 
been circulating that the one and only retailer to officially sign a lease agreement, 
Dillard’s Department Stores, may be pulling out of the agreement because of recent 
financial problems and stockholder discontent with the company’s financial performance.  
The mall has been approved to move ahead but nothing has happened as of August 2008. 
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CHAPTER VI 
BRUNSWICK, NEW YORK: BRUNSWICK SMART GROWTH 
 In December of 2004, a local newspaper published an article about the 
construction of a new Wal-Mart Supercenter in the center of the town of Brunswick.  The 
town already had an existing Wal-Mart located less than half a mile from the proposed 
location for the new Wal-Mart.  At the next town board meeting (January 2005) a small 
group of Brunswick residents showed up voicing concern over the proposal.  Residents 
who attended the town board meeting to learn more about the Wal-Mart proposal were 
stunned to find out that the town also had four large residential developments under 
consideration.  The combined residential developments, if built, would significantly 
change the rural landscape and increase the population18.  This small group of residents 
ended up exchanging contact information and decided to meet informally for a potluck 
supper in February.  Seventeen people showed up for this meeting, and the result of the 
meeting was Brunswick Smart Growth (BSG).  From the beginning, both the Wal-Mart 
Superstore and the proposed residential developments were seen as contradictory to the 
“town’s rural character” (FRAME).  As indicated by a 1999 survey of local Brunswick 
residents, many members of the community valued the rural setting of the community 
preferring open spaces of the countryside and the community’s strong farming tradition 
(absence of PUBLIC).   
                                                 
18
 Since BSG formed there have been two additional major residential developments that have 
been proposed bringing the total of six plus a Wal-Mart Supercenter.  In total, it is estimated that 
cumulative effect of all six proposals (an estimated 1,124 residential units – 756 of which have 
already been approved) could increase the town’s population by approximately 20 percent.  The 
town of Brunswick currently has roughly 5000 residential units and a population of 11,696.  
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 Brunswick, New York is composed of an array of winding, two lane roads that 
connect various hamlets and new developments.  There is no grid pattern to the 
community.  This is due in part to how the community was settled as well as the natural 
terrain of the area.  The community is located approximately 20 miles from both 
Massachusetts and Vermont and is located on the rolling hills prior to the Taconic 
Mountain range.  The city is spread out and has no city center, and it is divided into 
various zoning districts that regulate appropriate use of property.  However, the 
community has different areas devoted to residential, commercial, industrial, and 
agricultural land-use.  The community has strong roots in farming and maintains a strong 
agriculture sector, but the majority of residents work outside of the community.   
Brunswick is roughly fifteen minutes northeast of the state capitol, Albany, New 
York.  Troy is a city immediately adjacent to Brunswick’s west side and is approximately 
50,000.  Troy is more or less landlocked, which has resulted on pressure to develop open, 
cheaper land in Brunswick.  Troy also houses Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, a well-
known private research university (INDIG).  Troy has an urban feel and is much more 
densely populated.  Whereas, Brunswick is by and large a fairly homogenous community: 
white (about 96 percent) and middle class (median household income just over $56,000).  
A large portion of Brunswick’s residents have lived in the community their entire life.  
There is also a substantial aging population (roughly 15 percent of the overall population 
is considered senior citizens)19.  Local town elections are all decided by partisan 
elections, and the community has a history of voting Republican20.  As a result, the Town 
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 A number of the developments are being proposed as “empty nester” developments. 
20
 Republicans have held the majority of local, county, and state offices for over a decade. 
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Board Members (four) and Supervisor (one) are currently comprised of all Republicans21 
(Absence of POS).   
Following the original meeting in February 2005, BSG began organizing quickly 
and engaged a number of strategies to fight the Wal-Mart.  Shortly after the group 
formed, they distributed hundreds of yard signs stating “Preserve Brunswick’s Character” 
(TACTIC).  The signs were financed by a local union, the Troy Area Labor Council 
(TALC) (INDIG), a group also interested in fighting the Wal-Mart proposal.  By April 
2005, BSG had formally incorporated as a nonprofit corporation.  Today, BSG has 
roughly 230 members, 40 of whom are considered regular or active members (VIABLE).  
In addition to yard signs, the group circulated a petition against the flurry of development 
proposals before the Town Board and the effect these would have on already congested 
traffic patterns, school district and infrastructure costs, loss of open spaces and farmland, 
threat to air and water quality, and increase in light and noise pollution (FRAMES).  
Ultimately, it was BSG’s goal to halt all the development proposals to “conduct extensive 
public hearings to revise and improve Brunswick’s Comprehensive Plan to provide for 
appropriate and affordable growth that would preserve the Town’s essentially rural 
character” (FRAMES).  By December 2007, BSG collected 2028 signatures from local 
residents (approximately 23 percent of town residents over 18 years of age) (HIGH 
PART). 
In 2001, the town of Brunswick created a Comprehensive Plan, which identifies 
key values of the community and offers guidance for future growth.  A major component 
                                                 
21
 The Town Supervisor is a very successful local farmer and owns the largest dairy farm in the 
county.  He is also one of the largest landowner in the county.  The most influential Town Board 
member works for the State of New York Senate Majority Leader, Senator Joe Bruno.  Senator 
Bruno is also a Brunswick resident and successful developer. 
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of the document is its focus on maintaining Brunswick’s quality of life by promoting 
steady growth that reflects the town’s rural character.  The Comprehensive Plan 
recognizes the pressure for future development and states the town needs to embrace 
growth, but it also specifically states growth in residential units should not outpace 
economic growth, specifically employment opportunities.  One of the major limitations 
of the Comprehensive Plan is that it lacks any sort of requirement for periodic review.  
Since the adoption of the document in 2001, it had never been reviewed nor amended.  
Instead of adhering to zoning ordinances in place, the Town Board has employed the use 
of Planned Development Districts (PDD)22.   
When enacted, PDD is amended to the existing zoning, which gives the selected 
parcel of land its own, new zone with separate standards and regulations for 
development.  However, the surrounding area, or the original zoning district remains the 
same (e.g., a piece of land within an area zoned agriculture in the Comprehensive Plan 
essentially applies PDD and reclassifies it at the discretion of the Town Board).  The 
result is patchwork zoning where seemingly contradictory land designations are found 
one next to another.  PPDs were approved for two of the residential developments23, and 
the Wal-Mart Supercenter and the other residential developments were at some point, are 
currently at, or are in the planning stages of a PDD process. 
                                                 
22
 PDDs are intended to allow more flexibility with design and layout of new developments than 
allowed by current zoning regulations (e.g., zones with low density requirements could be 
amended to force certain areas to have higher density allowing for open/green space in other 
areas).  However, it is often employed as a way to skirt zoning regulations. 
23
 One proposed development is for 284 units (106 single-family homes and 178 senior citizen 
apartments) on 217 acres previously zoned part recreational and part residential.  The other for 
162 single family homes on 210 acres previously zoned agriculture. 
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In addition to the yard signs and a petition against the proposed developments, 
BSG engaged in public relations efforts through distributing informational flyers door-to-
door throughout the local community, writing letters to the editor to local and regional 
newspapers, and press releases.  Many core members became regular fixtures at Town 
Board meetings (HIGH PART).  The group also created a number of specialized 
committees to divide up the labor.  One committee formed was a research committee that 
has worked extensively on responding to draft scoping statement and Draft 
Environmental Impact Statement (DEIS)24 as part of the State Environmental Quality 
Review Act (SEQRA)25 process (VIABLE).   
The first development that brought the group together was the Wal-Mart 
Superstore proposed by a local developer from a nearby town.  The development was for 
a new Superstore on 33 acres less than a half mile from an existing Wal-Mart.  The store 
itself was proposed as a 200,000 square foot, 5 acre store with a 12-pump gas station and 
over 1000 parking spaces.  In addition to the close proximity of the existing Wal-Mart, 
there were also major concerns over the effect the development would have on adjacent 
federal wetland, increased traffic congestion on an already busy route, and blatant 
contradiction to the Comprehensive Plans call for commercial growth that is limited in 
size and scope (FRAMES).   
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 Document prepared by the developer to address the project’s potential impact on the 
environment. 
25
 Any project identified as having significant environmental impact is required by the town board 
to complete the SEQRA review.  The first step is to develop the Draft scope (outline of the items 
to be discussed in the DEIS).  After city feedback, a revised or Final Scope is submitted.  Then 
the DEIS is submitted.  This is followed a Final Environmental Impact Statement (a revised DEIS, 
or FEIS).  The public can comment on the Draft Scope (step one) and DEIS (step three) only. 
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The initial development proposal was submitted to the Town Board in February of 
2005, and over the next two years BSG fought the development proposal.  After 
incorporating, members of the group visited a nearby community, Ballston Spa, where 
residents were fighting a Wal-Mart Superstore as well (INDIG).  The group also followed 
the organizational plan outlined in Al Norman’s Sprawl-Busters, and engaged in a formal 
membership drive and fundraising efforts.  In November 2005, supporters of smart 
growth took part in a large anti-Wal-Mart rally organized by Capital District Wal-Mart 
Accountability Coalition and co-sponsored by BSG (TACTIC) (Sanzone 2005).  
Although the Wal-Mart proposal was always a concern for smart growth supporters, in a 
lot of ways, it simply opened the door to many more pressing issues including threats to 
the town’s rural character, contradictions between the Comprehensive Plan and the actual 
development process, and lack of consensus decision making and governmental 
transparency (POS).  Eventually, Wal-Mart withdrew its application in the Fall 2007.  
Many members feel this was in part due to the efforts of BSG, but the ultimate decision 
was left to New York’s Department of Environmental Conservation (STOP).  The 
Department would not grant Wal-Mart permits to build under their new storm water 
management regulation. 
At the original Wal-Mart Supercenter meeting (January 2005), the Final Scope for 
77 luxury multi-family garden apartment buildings was proposed by the same developer 
of the Wal-Mart and passed by the Town Board26.  The proposal was for 1116 units on 
215 acres of land previously zone agricultural.  The developer argued the need for the 
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 The project was originally introduced to the town board in December of 2004. 
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development to meet an increasingly diverse labor force in the Capital District27 as well 
as offer an alternative to buying a home.  The town accepted the DEIS in June 2005.  In 
August 2005, the Town Board held a public hearing on the proposed apartment complex.  
The room was filled to capacity (easily over a hundred attendees) with local residents, 
many of whom were members of BSG (HIGH PART).  The meeting ended with the 
Town Supervisor commenting the concerns raised by local residents would be addressed 
by the developer in future draft proposals.  The final steps of the SEQRA process was 
adopted by the town board two years later in August 2007.  Throughout the process, BSG 
and smart growth supporters stated their concern over the proposed developments effect 
on the “rural character” of town as well as the inconsistent nature of development with 
the Comprehensive Plan (FRAMES).  The final proposal had been scaled down 
significantly from 1116 units to 250 units, the addition of two baseball fields, and a 
conservation easement28.  Many BSG members view the significant reduction in the 
number of residential units as a result of pressure from the group (POLICY). 
In June 2004, a proposal for a 284 residential unit development (101 homes and 7 
senior citizen apartments) on 217 acres of land zoned part residential and part 
recreational was submitted to the Town Board.  The development proposal was submitted 
by a development group from Troy.  BSG became interested in this project shortly after 
organizing in February 2005.  The Town Board accepted the DEIS in November 2005.  
The FEIS was accepted August 2006, and the Town Board approved the project a month 
later.  The project could not officially go through until a water and sewer district for the 
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 Capital District refers to the four counties (Albany, Schenectady, Rensselaer, and Saratoga) 
that surround the capital of the state of New York, Albany. 
28
 An agreement not to develop part of the property. 
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PDD was created.  The water and sewer district was completed June 2007.  Smart growth 
proponents were present at Town Board meetings, and BSG commented on DEIS.  
Despite the Town Board asserting the project was in line with the Comprehensive Plan, 
concerns with the project related to its inconsistency with the Comprehensive Plan, and 
the fact that it, along with the other developments, lacks any meaningful discussion of the 
cumulative effects of all the developments (Absence of POS).  One major concern of the 
development is the increased infrastructure costs and the burden being placed on 
taxpayers.  It is estimated the development would require more than 2 miles of new sewer 
as well as new sewer and water districts. 
One of the most controversial developments was for 190 family homes on 210 
acres of land.  The land was originally zoned agricultural before it was rezoned as a PDD.  
In February 2005, the project was first introduced by a developer from Albany to the 
Town Board.  In November 2005, the Town Board accepted the DEIS.  This was 
followed by the acceptance of the FEIS in April 2006 and the town adopting the SEQRA 
findings and unanimously approving the project.  Like the other developments, BSG 
commented at various points in the SEQRA process about the project’s environmental 
impact and the effect it would have on the rural character of the town.  Again, the 
proposal claimed to be consistent with the 2001 Comprehensive Plan, but smart growth 
supporters were very concerned with the cumulative effects of all the projects.  In 
addition, traffic patterns and additional costs to the taxpayer for infrastructure and 
schools were also concerns (FRAMES).   
 The biggest problem with the development, however, was not it size.  The 
problem was the potential conflict of interest between the development and the Town 
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Supervisor (POS).  The land in question is owned by the Town Supervisor and his 
brother, a Rensselaer County Legislator.  In conflict of interest, it is estimated by the the 
Town Supervisor that if the land is cleared for development by the Town Board, the 
Albany-based developer will purchase the land for nearly 2 million dollars.  At the 
November 2005 Town Board meeting regarding the DEIS29, smart growth supporters 
packed the Town Hall to voice opposition to the development.  Although the Town 
Supervisor recused himself from voting, the public hearing on the project attracted well 
over 180 attendees within the building.  A large crowd also congregated outside the 
building next to open windows to listen to the public hearing (HIGH PART).  BSG 
leadership spoke out stating not enough time was given to the public to respond to the 
plan (Charniga 2005).   
 Other concerns were raised on the proposed density of the development and the 
conflict with the rural character of the town.  The project would preserve 135 acres of the 
210 for open space (60 acres of wetland).  The remaining land would hold 21 luxury 
manor homes, 29 single family homes, and 130 side-by-side carriage homes for empty 
nesters.  Shortly after the Town Board passed a resolution approving the PDD, a number 
of local residents and BSG brought suit against the town (TACTICS).  The group hired a 
local land-use attorney to review the Town Board’s actions for legal compliance and 
argued that the Town Board did not follow proper procedure when approving by 
resolution the PDD in land zoned agricultural.  The suit was dismissed in January 2007.   
During this same period of time from 2005 to 2007, the Town Board was in the 
process of reviewing and implementing a number of other residential developments.  One 
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 Earlier public hearings about the project also drew quite a bit of attention from local residents. 
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project was for the expansion of already existing apartments in town.  The project called 
for an additional five new buildings (12 units each) by extending the current PDD to 
include the targeted expansion area zoned agricultural.  The application for this project 
was approved May 2007.  The town has also considered two additional residential 
developments.  The first of the two is for a 136 unit condominium community on roughly 
16 acres of land (mostly agricultural).  The Town Board accepted a DEIS in April 2007.  
The other project is for 232 units including 120 condominium units, 39 townhouses, 48 
senior apartments, and 25 single family homes on 100 acres of land zoned agricultural. 
After the approval a number of the developments by the Town Board and the 
perception elected officials were not listening to the concerns of local residents, another 
lawsuit was filed against the town (TACTICS).  In December 2007, BSG and a number 
of local residents filed suit against the town stating the cumulative effect of new 
developments either approved or in review did not comply with the 2001 Comprehensive 
Plan.  The lawsuit calls for the Town to amend the comprehensive plan to have periodic 
reviews and updates of the plan, to adopt land-use regulations consistent with the plan 
(rather then the ad hoc use of PDD), to assess of the cumulative effects of all of the 
proposed developments on the town, and to consider whether or not the cumulative effect 
of the proposals is consistent with the existing Comprehensive Plan (FRAMES).  As of 
August 2008, the lawsuit is still under review. 
 Throughout this struggle, many supporters of smart growth became much more 
involved in local politics.  As a result of the partisan election for Town Board and Town 
Supervisor, BSG and smart growth supporters naturally gravitated toward the challenging 
political party.  BSG from the beginning of the organization intended to remain non-
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partisan.  However, with Republicans in all elected positions, new candidates from BSG 
ranks and established Democratic Party locals begin to run for office using smart growth 
as a major part of their platform (SOCIAL).  Shortly after BSG was formed in 2005, they 
endorsed a local democrat running for Town Board.  The challenger was defeated in 
November 2005 by a 146 vote margin.  BSG also attempted to host a number of 
candidate debates.  In the Fall of 2005, the group tried to host a candidates’ debate with 
the League of Women Voters (INDIG) as the official sponsor and moderator, but all 
incumbents refused to participate.  In November 2007, two Town Board positions and the 
Town Supervisor office were up for reelection.  All three spots were challenged by 
Democrats who ran on smart growth principles.  Again, all challengers fell short of 
victory and the Town Board (one incumbent and one new Republican candidate) and 
Town Supervisor (incumbent) remained in the hands of the Republicans30 (Absences of 
REPRESENT).  However, it was the largest voter turnout for local election ever.   
Since the beginning of the conflict, pro-development supporters have attempted to 
paint BSG and smart growth supporters as anti-growth.  All of the key organizers who 
were interviewed stated that the group was being painted as an anti-growth group.  Five 
out of the nine interviewed state they felt their participation in the group has changed 
how others within community see them.  Even more prominent, all of the key organizers, 
with the exception of one, stated their participation has changed how they view 
themselves.  In particular, eight of the nine respondents stated involvement with BSG has 
shaped how they identify themselves as feeling empowered or being an empowered 
citizen (IDENTITY). 
                                                 
30
 Roughly 25 percent of registered voters in Brunswick are identified as Democrat. 
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During election cycles, there have also been attempts to link BSG with the local 
Democratic Party suggesting unethical political connections, and democratic challengers 
who embrace smart growth principles would raise property taxes.  Since BSG formed, the 
Town of Brunswick’s website had very little information on it.  However, after two years 
of sustained opposition to the proposed developments by smart growth supporters, the 
town website has improved significantly (POLICY).  Now all meeting transcripts, 
minutes, and documents are posted online.  Smart growth proponents have influenced the 
development process by slowing it down from previous approvals on all seven of the 
developments.  However, the group’s efforts cannot be directly linked to either outright 
stopping the Wal-Mart proposal (STOP) or stopping the approval of any of the other 
residential developments.  Although none of the development proposals have been 
stopped, many have scaled down significantly (POLICY).    
One of the main issues that smart growth supporters have fought for is to follow 
the 2001 Comprehensive Plan and to approve developments that enhance not contradict 
or degrade the rural character of the town.  To this day, there is still no active planning 
and no zoning map to accompany the Comprehensive Plan.  Another major focus of the 
group is to raise public awareness of the cumulative effects of the developments and to 
promote an alternative view of development.  Generally speaking, many of the group 
members feel that the efforts of BSG have had a significant impact on raising public 
consciousness.  This is evident from a hugely successful petition drive, the record crowds 
at Town Board meetings, and the large number of letters to the editor in the two local 
newspapers voicing opposition to the developments and support for smart growth.  The 
group has also been very successful at raising financial support for its efforts including 
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developing and distributing a newsletter and hiring legal advice for the two lawsuits 
(SOCIAL). 
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CHAPTER VII 
CENTREVILLE, MARYLAND: CITIZENS FOR GREATER CENTREVILLE 
 In the early 1980s, a local developer bought 6.5 acres of land at the headwaters of 
the Corsica River31 in Centreville, Maryland.  The Wharf, as it is called, is traversed by a 
narrow road and bridge that split the land into two parcels.  The front 5 acres of land 
located directly next to a tributary of Chesapeake Bay had previously been used as a 
fertilizer depot.  The back 1.5 acres of land held tidal wetlands and had never been 
developed32.  Both pieces of land are considered to be in a floodplain.  The developer 
proposed to build roughly 15 townhouses on the property.  However, a group of local 
residents considered the land crucial to the town and the Chesapeake Bay and felt the 
influx in residents to this specific area would result traffic congestion and safety issues 
(FRAMES).  As a result, the group fought the development by arguing the road and 
bridge, neither of which could be expanded because of the landscape, could not handle 
the traffic and would not provide the needed access to the area in case of emergency.  The 
group repeatedly brought suit against the town and the developer losing over and over 
again (TACTICS).  However, the project was delayed long enough to the point where the 
economy took a downturn and the developer could not finance it (POS).  The developer 
sat on the land for over fifteen years until the late 1990s when he put it on the market for 
$600,000.   
                                                 
31
 The Corsica River is a tidal river and one of the main tributaries to the Chesapeake Bay.  The 
river is currently on the Environmental Protection Agency’s Impaired Rivers List. 
32
 Currently, the property is roughly 4 acres including the back 1.5 acres and 2.39 acres on the 
waterfront.  The other portion of the land has a small private commercial development and a 
parking lot/boat launch area owned by the county. 
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 Around the same time, a group of local citizens encouraged the Queen Anne’s 
County Commissioners to purchase the land for a public park and access point to the 
water (INDIG).  First, the land immediately next to the Wharf Property was already 
owned and operated by the county.  Second, under the county’s Parks and Recreation 
Department, the county could apply for both federal and state monies to purchase the 
land outright.  The county refused to act.  The group also tried to encourage the Town 
Council (comprised of three members) to get involved in the process.  However, the 
President of the Town Council was not receptive to the idea and refused to take action.  
The land sat on the market for a couple of years, and in 2001, a group by the name of the 
Centreville Wharf, LLC bought the Wharf property for $1.1 million.  The development 
corporation originally proposed 30 condominiums on 2.39 acres of land on the waterfront 
portion.  The development corporation argued the property was considered derelict and in 
need of redevelopment to make the land productive again.  From the moment the project 
was proposed, the development faced a number of difficulties including the land’s 
location in a floodplain, the land set within 1000 feet of the Chesapeake Bay waterways, 
and the need for substantial variance to the natural landscape (three feet of infill to raise 
the land).  In addition, the proposed development would be significantly higher than any 
of the surrounding buildings in town and the town’s comprehensive plan had the area 
designated for public use (POS). 
Centreville was formed in 1792 as a planned community and has basically 
remained the same size over the last two centuries.  According to the 2000 census, 
Centreville has a population of 1,970.  As of 2004, Centreville’s population is estimated 
to be 2,534 persons.  During this four year time period, Centreville experienced the 
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greatest rate of population growth in its history (POS).  Centreville is located in Queen 
Anne’s County (population 40,563) and is the county seat.  It was chosen as the county 
seat because of its access to the wharf.  Centreville is located on the Eastern Shore of 
Maryland, roughly 15 minutes from the Chesapeake Bay Bridge, which is the only access 
to this part of the Eastern Shore, and is approximately one hour from the 
Annapolis/Baltimore area.  The Eastern Shore and the Centreville area considered rural 
with the primary use of land being agricultural.  In addition, Centreville, like many other 
towns on the Eastern Shore, is tidal waterways and is known for fishing, crabbing, and 
transportation access to the Chesapeake Bay.   
Over the last few decades, Centreville has become a bedroom community for 
people who work in the Annapolis-Baltimore area with roughly 60 percent of the 
population commuting to work.  There is one main road into town from the Interstate.  
The road splits into two once within city limits and encompasses the heart of the town.  
The highway joins again on the other side of the town and eventually leads to the town of 
Chestertown.  The community has a downtown with a number of special niche stores, 
restaurants, and legal firms.  Many of these businesses remain open and thrive due to the 
district court house located downtown.  
In 2001, when the wharf development was first proposed, a group of citizens33 
came together, organized and incorporated as Citizens for Greater Centreville (CGC).   
Approximately sixty people showed up at the initial meeting (HIGH PART).  In July 
2001, despite major opposition by CGC, Centreville’s Planning Commission 
                                                 
33
 This group, which became CGC, included two of the main organizers from the early 1980’s 
Wharf property dispute as well as a number of the citizens from the late 1990’s who pushed for 
the county to buy the property. 
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recommended Wharf zoning changes with three minor stipulations34 to the Town 
Council.  The front 5 acres of land was zoned C2, which is commercial/industrial.  
However, the land needed to be rezoned for residential use, or R3, a classification 
allowing for the densest residential development.   The zoning changes were set for the 
Town Council’s vote during the early fall of 2001.  However, CGC, under the guidance 
of legal counsel, successfully convinced the Town Council to reject rezoning 
(TACTICS).   
In a letter submitted to the Town Council by the group’s lawyer, a number of 
problems, many procedural, were identified.  For example, the town must satisfy a 
number of state and town laws and requirements in relation to the development including 
rectifying inconsistencies between the town’s Comprehensive Plan and proposed use of 
the land.  In particular, smart growth state policy requires all local development to focus 
on commercial growth.  The town of Centreville had 42 (4 percent) out of its 1048 acres 
designated commercial use.  The rezoning of the front portion of the land to R3 would 
essentially eliminate 16 percent of the town’s commercial land-use designation.  Also, 
according to the town’s Comprehensive Plan, “The wharf provides a unique 
opportunity…to create a small scale, mixed use waterfront development that could 
include improved public landing, marina facility, passive waterfront park area, a small 
outdoor amphitheater/bandstand for public festivals and events and a small restaurant and 
tourist/boat supply store.”  None of these were being proposed in the project (POS).   
                                                 
34
 The three stipulations included slight changes in density with concern for traffic patterns on the 
road/bridge, allowing public access to the water, and the number of variances required to build 
the project as originally proposed. 
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Under state law and according to the town’s own plan, all developments are 
required to follow “community-based development35” in the development process, which 
the development process had not done to this point.  This was a particular point of 
contention because the Wharf property sits on land at the edge of the incorporated town 
and roughly half of CGC’s active membership are individuals who live either on land 
contiguous to or within sight of the proposed development.  Politically, under 
Centreville’s town law, these individuals had no say in the development.  Also, the 
development must be compatible with the surrounding environment.  Another problem 
was the project did not take into consideration the historical significance of this piece of 
property, and the project did not incorporate nearby historic landmarks (POS).  Finally, 
the cumulative impacts of two already approved developments (395 age restricted homes 
and 485 one-third acre homes) with the condominiums had not been considered (POS).  
The state of Maryland was the first state in the nation to adopt and implement 
smart growth policies.  Under the leadership of Governor Glendening, the 1997 General 
Assembly passed smart growth legislation36.  Essentially, smart growth legislation was 
instituted as a way to combat development pressures from the sprawling east coast.  A 
unique quality of Maryland is that it has a history of progressive state level land-use 
                                                 
35
 Any stakeholder involved (whether property owner or nearby citizen) should have some input in 
what happens with the land. 
36
 In 1997, Maryland’s General Assembly passed five pieces of legislation and budget initiatives 
referred to as “Smart Growth.”  The legislation dealt with focusing development in areas where 
infrastructure already exists, protecting natural resources, protecting taxpayers from subsidizing 
infrastructure costs accrued from sprawling developments, and improving quality of life for 
communities by preserving rural, suburban, or urban character.  More specifically, legislation 
dealt with Brownfields, Job Creation Tax Credits, Priority Funding Areas Act, Live Near Your 
Work, and Rural Legacy.  The state promotes ten principles including mixed land uses, compact 
building design, diverse housing choices, walkable communities, well-planned, attractive, and 
distinctive communities, natural resource preservation, diverse transportation options, use of 
existing infrastructure, predictable, fair, and cost effective development decisions, and 
collaborative development decisions. 
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policies.  Many of these policies have played a crucial role in setting the stage for smart 
growth legislation including a state level intervention policy (1974) allowing Maryland’s 
Department of Planning to partake in any land-use proceeding at local, county, or state 
level; the 1992 Economic Growth, Resource Protection, and Planning Act, which 
promotes focused development, natural areas protection, and funding for planned 
development and requires local comprehensive plans to address these issues; and the 
Critical Areas Program (also known as the Critical Areas Act, or CAA) enacted in 1984 
(amended in 2002) under the Chesapeake Bay Protection Act, which monitors 1000-foot 
buffer inland from the shoreline of the Chesapeake Bay and its tributaries and adjacent 
tidal wetlands37 (POS).    
Prior to the enactment of CAA, there was a major push by land owners within this 
buffer to plat land in small parcels (under 65 acres) to be grandfathered into the new law.  
CAA has been very important for citizen groups fighting development.  Because the 
Wharf was previously developed, the land is exempt from Critical Areas.  However, the 
law still gave CGC leverage because CAA required the preservation of the natural health 
and beauty of the Chesapeake Bay and its major waterways.  Additionally, the law states 
only 600 cubic yards of infill for landscape variance can be used per lot.  The Wharf 
required much more than the allotted 600 cubic yards of infill (POS). 
                                                 
37
 The purpose of the Critical Areas Act (CAA) is to regulate land use within the buffer by forcing 
local officials to mitigate the negative effects of development on water quality and natural habitat.  
CAA, however, does still allow for development.  Any lot zoned or rezoned on or before 
December 1, 1985 held a grandfathered status retaining its land-use designation regardless if the 
use conflicts with CAA.  However, there are still circumstances in which the land in question is 
subject to CAA oversight (e.g., significant variance, or more than 600 cubic yards of infill, to the 
land). 
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Despite many of these state level policies, over the last decade, Centreville has 
experienced a push for major development.  Part of the problem was Centreville’s 
inability to properly deal with and manage the type of rapid expansion being presented.  
Around the same time the Wharf property was bought, the town had a number of major 
developments under construction.  The Town Council had annexed a piece of farm land 
contiguous to the town borders.  The annexation was supposed to be for a number of five 
acre luxury homes with a golf course.  However, in the original agreement, there was a 
clause that if the right golf course design could not be arranged with an architect then the 
land can be changed to something else.  The something else turned into 485 one-third 
acre homes on the outskirts of town.  At the time, Centreville had a population of 1,970 
and 866 residential units (of which approximately 250 considered single-family homes) 
in the entire town.  On the other side of town, a Maryland-based developer built an age 
restricted development (over the age of 55) with 395 homes.  This development is very 
isolated and insular from the town (POS).   
 In April 2004, a local Baltimore area television news station broke a major story 
over Centreville’s wastewater treatment plan dumping excess sewage directly into the 
Corsica River.  With the help of a local Centreville area resident and CGC member, the 
news station had conducted an investigative report coming from a former employee of 
the wastewater plant who alleged the company knew about possible violations.  The 
cause of the pollution was due to increased development in the area and the Wastewater 
Plant’s inability to handle the volume of waste coming through it.  As a result, the plant 
regularly pumped hazardous sewage directly into the Corsica River (in excess of 30 
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percent of the plants operating ability)38.  Furthermore, there were times the pumps would 
shutdown altogether and raw sewage was spit directly into the river and were never 
reported to state authorities.   
Making the issue even worse, the whistleblower had raised concerns to his 
superior and also written a letter to the Town Council in January 2004 stating his 
concerns over plant’s capacity to handle increased sewage (POS) (WBAL-TV11 2004a).  
He was fired from his post two days prior the news story uncovering the sewage problem.  
His firing occurred when he made public comments at a Town Council meeting stating 
that the Town Manager had not dealt with the sewage problem despite being told the 
plant was regularly exceeding capacity (WBAL-TV11 2004b).  The town manager and 
the plant superintendent were the same person and was the whistleblower’s immediate 
supervisor.  He was fired less than a week after the story broke (WBAL-TV11 2004c).  
Allegations over falsifying records of the sewage spills were leveled against the town and 
the Town manager stating that the sewage numbers needed to be low to continue 
development in town.  When the story broke, a number of environmental organizations, 
state officials and agencies, and federal agencies investigated the plant.  Investigations 
uncovered a number of issues and resulted in a number of sanctions.  The local television 
station news team uncovered records that the Maryland Department of the Environment 
(MDE) had ordered the town to fix the plant as early as October of 2001.  At the 
following Town Council meeting after the story broke, the Town Council imposed a 30-
day moratorium on all new development (stopping the immediate construction of roughly 
                                                 
38
 From January to March 2003, the plant exceeded sewage flow by 588 percent.  However, 
documents show that sewage spills had been occurring for the last decade. 
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650 new homes) (POS).  The council president, also the vice president of a local 
development corporation, lost a re-election bid around the time that story broke and was 
accused of knowing about the problem well before the story was made public39.  The 
Maryland Attorney General’s office Environmental Crime Unit investigated the 
allegations.  For the first time in the state’s history, the state of Maryland imposed an 
indefinite suspension of building new homes and businesses in Centreville40 (POS).  A 
lawsuit was filed against the town of Centreville because of the imposed building 
moratorium (WBAL-TV11 2004d).   
 The combination of state level smart growth policies, rapid development in the 
area, and uncovering of sewage problems due to overdevelopment gave CGC 
considerable leverage in fighting the Wharf Development.  As a result, a couple of CGC 
supporters and proponents of controlled growth practices had gained access to local 
office.  One CGC member was appointed to Planning Commission and another had won 
election for Town Council (REPRESENT).  Also, following petition drives41, letters to 
the editor, public statements at Town Council meetings, and litigation, CGC had 
successfully stalled the Wharf project.  Many CGC members were still actively lobbying 
the county to purchase the land.  In June 2005, the Wharf development received approval 
from the Centreville Board of Zoning Appeals for significant variance to the landscape.   
It was not until January 2006, however, that the Planning Commission granted Final 
Approval of the project.  A number of CGC members spoke out against the development 
                                                 
39
 The development company of the President of the Town Council had worked on engineering 
plans for some of the new developments in town. 
40
 The ban was lifted in February 2005 following the completion of a new sewage treatment 
facility. 
41
 One petition drive resulted in over 400 signatures urging the county to purchase the land. 
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and argued the need for the land to be used for public use (HIGH PART).  The Town 
Council meeting this same month ended with a unanimous vote giving the Town 
Manager the right to meet with the developer of the property and to discuss the potential 
purchasing of all or a portion of the land (TACTICS).  After continued pressure by CGC 
through public relations campaign, lawsuits against the developer, and economic 
pressure42, the Wharf LLC decided to put the property on the market and the town 
eventually bought part of the land.  In 2007, the town floated a bond issue to buy the 
waterfront property for $2 million from the development group43 (STOP).  The town 
officially received deed to the front part of the Wharf property on June 7th, 2007. 
 The town bought the property with the idea of turning it into a gateway to the 
waterfront and to the town center.  After the town purchased the land, a committee of 
local citizens called the Centreville Wharf Advisory Committee (CWAC) was created to 
evaluate what the best use for the property would be.   CWAC recommended a number of 
uses for the property including adding additional transient slips, a floating dock, a fishing 
pier, a two-story cultural and heritage center, recreational rental center, offices, 
observation deck, a playground, commercial space, residential units, native wetlands and 
living shoreline, additional parking, a boardwalk with railings, open space,  and a 
bandstand (POLICY).  In September 2007, CWAC voted unanimously to forward a 
number of recommendations to the Town Council including conducting an environmental 
analysis of the land, performing substantial clean up of the area (removing concrete 
foundation and filling in large open pits), and stabilizing the shoreline.  In December 
                                                 
42
 The housing market in the area also started to slow during this time as well. 
43
 The result of the bond issue is that Centreville residents are now paying an additional 10 
percent on local city taxes.  The land could have been bought originally for $600,000 with state 
and federal grant money by the county. 
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2007, the Town Council adopted the recommendations for the CWAC.  The town is 
looking to add ten slips for public use, a trail that connects with an existing trail in town, 
and a boardwalk with two observation/fishing piers.  There is no timeline for construction 
to begin and the town is seeking grant money to fund the project.  The property will be 
used by the public for a number of years and the city will decide what to do with it later.  
As of July 2008, the town is actively seeking a professional planner for the site.  
Currently, the Town Council is split about how to proceed: one member wants to pursue 
grant money through the state’s Open Spaces Fund and the other two want to sell it back 
to a private owner44 (POS).  The property is still vacant today and has been for over the 
last 30 years.  
 Throughout this land-use dispute, CGC has worked in a fairly welcoming 
community.  The Wharf property has been an area of concern and contention for local 
residents for many years.  Many of the local area residents have been supportive of using 
at least some part of the land for public use.  This is evident both in the town’s 1998 
Community Plan and in a 1995 needs assessment survey conducted by the Centreville 
Community Plan Citizen Advisory Committee.  The results of the survey found that the 
second most identified goal for the community was to “improve public access and 
utilization of the Corsica River waterfront” (Absence of PUBLIC).  CGC and its 
leadership has also developed working relationships with other non-profit and advocacy 
groups in the area including Corsica River Conservancy (CRC), Queen Anne’s 
Conservation Association, and Citizens Alliance to Save Our County (SOCIAL).  The 
                                                 
44
 One of the main points of contention is regarding pursuing state money through the Open 
Spaces Fund.  The fund is used for the preservation of open space to be used for public access.  
A stipulation of receiving the money, however, is that it precludes any future development on 
parcels of land that receive and use funding.  
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CRC has been a particularly useful alliance to CGC.  CRC has publicly spoke out against 
the development of Wharf property and urged county commissioners and Centreville 
Town Council to buy the land for public use and to protect the Corsica River (INDIG).  
The CRC also played a role in advising the Town Council since the town purchased the 
land.   
 Support by the broader public has seemed to be split down the middle.  A number 
of CGC members have stated that community members who have been in Centreville 
their whole life, the “locals,” are put off by CGC standing up to the developers and the 
local government.  Also, many of the locals have the mindset that only those born and 
raised in Centreville should have the right to say what should and should not happen.  
Where this split really became evident was over the wastewater plant dumping 
allegations.  The negative press coverage of the town and the ensuing criminal 
investigations by EPA angered many local residents and saw groups like CGC as 
troublemakers giving the town a bad reputation.   
This sentiment was echoed in interviews by a few of the respondents (three of the 
six) stating that their involvement has influence how others view them.  More 
specifically, respondents stated they felt that some within the community viewed them as 
“activists” who were part of a “secret organization.”  A similar finding can be seen 
regarding how respondents view themselves after participating in CGC.  Again, three of 
the six respondents mentioned their involvement has changed how they view them self 
stating a feeling of empowerment or having the ability to make a difference (lack of 
IDENTITY).  
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At its peak, CGC had approximately 100 members with roughly half within the 
town and the other half just outside of the town.  The group raised approximately $30,000 
to fight the Wharf development (VIABLE).  The majority of the money has been used for 
legal fees.  CGC has really evolved into a group that distributes information regarding 
land-use, development, and growth issues.  According to many of the member of CGC, 
there is a shared feeling that the group’s nonpartisan stance helped garner more support 
from the local community.  From this apolitical stance, CGC has gained respect from the 
local residents and is recognized as a spokesperson for local area residents.  From the 
beginning, CGC has mobilized around preserving the Wharf for public use.  Additional 
collective action frames related to environmental degradation and protection of the 
Corsica River, historic preservation, and maintenance of a small town atmosphere have 
been major themes put forth by CGC advocates.  To a lesser extent, but still prominent, a 
theme of open government, governmental responsiveness and accountability has 
emerged.  One of the main successes of the CGC is related to the providing of a wealth of 
information related to local land-use decisions to the local public.  In many ways, CGC 
has become an information broker to the greater Centreville area.  Not only does CGC 
provide regular updates on town actions and concerns, but since the group that has 
organized, the town of Centreville has upgraded its website significantly offering much 
more information to the public (POLICY). 
 The historical importance of the waterways to this area has been one of the things 
that have lead to such widespread support of CGC and its fight against the Wharf side 
condominium development.  Maryland’s role in local level land-use rules and regulations 
and its leadership in the nation as a smart growth state also offer an unparalleled level of 
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public awareness of land-use planning and development.  This is felt very strongly on the 
Eastern Shore because of its geographical location.  The Eastern Shore remains 
predominately rural in an area experiencing major development pressures (with 
Wilmington, Philadelphia, and New York City to the North, Baltimore, Annapolis, and 
Washington DC to the West, and Virginia Beach to the South).   
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CHAPTER VIII 
QUALITATIVE COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
Briefly, QCA is an inductive approach used for small-N comparison.  QCA 
allows the researcher to start with a complex social phenomenon looking for causal and 
outcome properties.  If a causal factor or outcome property is found to be present, then it 
is coded “1.”  If the variable is absent, it is coded “0.”  Through the process of comparing 
and contrasting multiple cases by identifying either the presence or absence of a given 
factor, similar combinations of factors are identified and irrelevant factors are dropped.  
Simplified paths of causal conditions are connected to outcome properties.   
Table 7 incorporates all causal variables and outcome variables.  Political 
outcomes are listed as the ultimate dependent variable and social and cultural outcomes 
are listed as intermediate outcome.   
Table 7. Causal Factors, Intermediate Outcomes, and Political Outcomes  
  Causal Variables  Intermediate Political 
SMO SMO Factors Environmental Factors Outcomes Outcomes 
 A B C D E F G H I J X Y Z 
ASG 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 
BSG 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 
CGC 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 
A = VIABLE 
B = TACTICS 
C = HIGH PART 
D = FRAMES 
E = POS 
F = INDIG 
G = MEDIA 
H = PUBLIC 
 
I = SOCIAL 
J = IDENTITY 
 
X = POLICY 
Y = REPRESENT 
Z = STOP   
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The reason political outcomes remains the dependent variable and social and cultural 
outcomes are moved to the independent variables are twofold.  First, although researchers 
have suggested that there are an array of areas social movement can influence change, the 
overwhelming majority ultimately work within the political milieu; that is, social 
movements typically make their demands and target individuals, groups, and institutions 
within the political arena.  This is not the case for all social movements (most notably 
religious based movements), but for land-based social movements such as smart growth 
movements, the focus is to change political process and to implement systemic political 
change.  Second, although viewed as overlapping arenas of outcomes, the analytical 
framework used in this project suggests in most cases social and cultural outcomes, 
whether intentional or unintentional, precede political outcomes. Furthermore, there is 
strong evidence which suggests gains in the social and cultural arena may either help or 
hinder outcomes in the political arena. 
A number of things can be deduced from Table 7.  For the Ames Smart Growth 
movement (ASG), three QCA equations are displayed for the outcomes of SOCIAL, 
POLICY and REPRESENT.  The equations can be displayed (see Table 8) as X = 
ABCdEFGHIj, Y = ABCdEFGHIj, and I = ABCdEFGH or: 
Table 8. Pathway to Outcomes: Ames Smart Growth 
Pathway Outcomes 
VIABLE * TACTICS * HIGH PART * frames * POS * 
INDIG * MEDIA * PUBLIC * SOCIAL * identity 
 
POLICY and REPRESENT 
VIABLE * TACTICS * HIGH PART * frames * POS * 
INDIG * MEDIA * PUBLIC 
 
SOCIAL 
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When presenting results, variables in capital letters suggest the presence of a causal 
condition and lowercase letters suggest the absence of the variable.  Furthermore, an 
asterisk (*) indicates “and.”   
For ASG, there is evidence of a strong lead SMO (VIABLE), the employment of 
disruptive and legal and political tactics (TACTICS), the mobilization of a large number 
of participants (HIGH PART), evidence of a relatively open and supportive political 
climate (POS), and the presence of experienced leadership and SMOs from previous 
land-use struggles (INDIG).  Also, ASG supporters became a legitimate voice within the 
broader community and had new connections with other local organizations within the 
community (SOCIAL).  ASGA as an organization became a broker of information for 
other groups in town and a number of the movement leadership gained access to other 
important community positions.  ASG did not develop a strong negative collective 
identity, as perceived by bystanders.   
There has been evidence smart growth supporters have influenced both the 
dialogue and outcomes of local policies and processes (POLICY) and local city elections 
(REPRESENT).  The pro-mall mayor even included components of environmental 
sustainability, responsible development and consensus decision making in the “State of 
the City” address.  First, there have been a number of concessions made on the mall 
proposal including limiting growth in the designated area, securing money for 
infrastructure costs such as bike, pedestrian and bus, creating an environmental buffer to 
protect the marsh, developing a welcome center, and committing tax revenue to 
redevelopment issues.  The group also opened the development process up, or at least 
made it much more visible within the local community.  City Council has intentionally 
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made subsequent development proposals much more accessible and in some cases has 
actively sought public input.  Pressure from ASGA has also helped push the City Council 
to appropriate money for sustainability issues in 2008-2009 as well as helped influence 
the city to sign onto the US Mayors’ Climate Protection Agreement45.  In addition, over 
the time period of the mall controversy, three smart growth candidates were elected to 
city council and a number of ASGA core members have been included on committees 
related to the mall development plans, the GOZD, and future growth discussions.  
Although there has been some divisions among smart growth leadership and smart 
growth city council members regarding the mall compromise, the city council still leans 
strongly toward smart growth (two solidly smart growth supporters and two others 
supportive of smart growth policies). 
Despite the group’s success related to social outcomes and political outcomes, 
specifically related to POLICY and REPRESENT, ASG did not form a strong collective 
identity (IDENTITY) nor did the movement ultimately stop the development (STOP).   
The lack of outcomes on these two fronts could be attributed to a couple of negative 
factors working against them.  First, from the beginning, ASGA and movement 
participants clearly identified a common problem (diagnostic frames), or the mall.  
However, the group had difficulty clearly defining a solution (prognostic frames) to the 
problem.  Some of the earliest collective action frames dealt with the threat the mall 
posed to built capital (downtown and the existing mall), natural capital (loss of farmland 
and environmental impact on an adjacent marsh), and social capital (reducing quality of 
                                                 
45
 The agreement includes list of environmental issues that cities can do to help combat Global 
Warming such as land-use, energy production and conservation, recycling, waste reduction, and 
transportation. 
92 
 
 
 
life).  Later, common themes related to political capital (city council representing elite 
interests and not following political process) and cultural capital (critique of 
consumerism and unregulated growth) also emerged.  In each case, a fairly consistent 
message of what was wrong (diagnostic frames) with the new mall was being 
communicated.  Almost all organizational literature, position papers, interviewees, court 
petitions, and so on represented some variation of the proposed new mall being a threat to 
the community and environment.  However, a common, clearly defined prognostic frame 
was not present.  There were divisions in message related to outright stopping the mall to 
finding a more suitable location to completely overhauling the LUPP, changing the 
political process, and removing political officials.  
 Also, ASG participants ran into problems within the broader socio-political 
environment.  From the beginning the local newspaper came out in favor of the proposed 
mall touting the benefits of building a new mall, doing spotlight pieces about the 
developer and the success of his other developments, and regularly editorializing about 
the need for growth and the need to build the mall to resolve a divided city.  Finally, 
although ASG amassed a large following, there was also strong evidence of substantial 
public support for the mall as evident by the number of pro-mall supporters who came 
out in favor of the mall (i.e., attendance at city meetings, letters to the editor, and election 
outcomes) after smart growth candidates took office. 
 For the Brunswick Smart Growth movement (BSG), three equations for social 
movement outcomes in all three arenas, specifically SOCIAL, IDENTITY, and STOP 
(see Table 9), are I = AbCDefGhj, J = AbCDefGhi, and Z = AbCDefGhIJ, or: 
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Table 9. Pathway to Outcomes: Brunswick Smart Growth 
Pathway Outcomes 
VIABLE * tactics * HIGH PART * FRAMES * pos * indig * MEDIA * 
public * SOCIAL * IDENTITY 
 
STOP 
VIABLE * tactics * HIGH PART * FRAMES * pos * indig * MEDIA * 
public * IDENTITY 
 
SOCIAL 
VIABLE * tactics * HIGH PART * FRAMES * pos * indig * MEDIA * 
public * SOCIAL 
 
IDENTITY 
 
 
The political success related to stopping the Wal-Mart Supercenter, impacting at 
least some of the development plans, and forcing the town to make development 
proposals much more accessible to the public can be attributed to a number of factors.  
Internally, BSG was a formidable opponent with a viable lead organization (VIABLE), 
high levels of sustained participation (HIGH PART), and clear diagnostic and prognostic 
frames (FRAMES).  Also, within the community of Brunswick, although there is obvious 
support from certain segments of the population, there is no strong evidence of broad 
based support (PUBLIC) for any or all of the developments.  BSG also became a 
legitimate voice of opposition to the developments and were looked at as information 
brokers to the broader community.  In addition, BSG as an organization had developed a 
fairly broad reaching coalition of supporters and collaborators including Troy-based 
group, county level organizations, and local political parties (SOCIAL).  Although 
SOCIAL as an outcome is weaker than ASGA, BSG did develop many new connections 
with other organizations in the area.  However, BSG has yet to gain leadership roles 
within the community.  This is partly due to the group’s inability to gain important 
representation within the town government. 
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This success seems to be attributable to viable organization, high levels of 
sustained visual participation by movement supporters, and a clear and consistent 
message.  Out of the three groups, BSG was the only one to develop a distinct collective 
identity broadly identified by members’ consistently stating a feeling of empowered 
citizen and committed smart growth supporter (IDENTITY).  This was further 
exemplified by many of the interviewees stating how they felt BSG was being portrayed 
as an anti-growth group.   
 Although collective identity helped empower a committed core group, which in 
turn may have helped with gains within the political realm, this may have also hurt the 
group in its attempts to influence policy change and gain representation within the local 
government.  Also, and perhaps more importantly, one of the distinct features of 
Brunswick’s broader socio-political environment is the combination of little to no 
political opportunity structures and obvious support for the developments by a local area 
newspaper.  For POS, the community had not directly experienced massive developments 
or any blatant environmental degradation due to overdevelopment.  Also, the local town 
officials are elected through partisan elections in a predominately republican area.  As a 
result, the town government has been extremely unresponsive to the concerns of BSG.  
Furthermore, BSG has had no sympathetic elite allies within the town government and 
did not have any outright support from local business leaders.  In fact, the Town Board 
was very supportive of all the developments.  Finally, the state of New York has only 
recently been looking to adopt smart growth policies.  The combination of all these 
factors made it very difficult for smart growth proponents to gain any sort of 
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representation in town government and made it nearly impossible to influence any policy 
level changes. 
Finally, Citizens for Greater Centreville (CGC) was successful in all three areas 
of political outcomes, or POLICY, REPRESENT, and STOP (see Table 10). These 
successful outcomes can be attributed to X = AbcDEfghij, Y = AbcDEfghij, and Z = 
AbcDEfghij, or: 
Table 10. Pathway to Outcomes: Citizens for Greater Centreville 
Pathway Political Outcomes 
ORG VIABLE * tactics * high part * FRAMES * POS * 
indig * media * public * social * identity 
 
POLICY, REPRESENT, and STOP 
 
Like the other two groups, CGC developed a fairly viable organization.  The group had 
particular success at raising money to hire a lawyer and fight the development in court.   
Also, from the very beginning, the group’s message was very straight forward: do not 
develop the Wharf Property because of its historical and environmental significance 
(diagnostic frames).  Additionally, a plausible solution was to have the county purchase 
the property and turn it into a space for public use (prognostic frames).  One of the 
group’s main goals has been to remain non-partisan acting as a watchdog group, a public 
voice, and an information broker to the broader public.  And although CGC has become a 
legitimate voice within the community, it has not been painted as an anti-growth, 
partisan, or polarizing group.  As a result, a strong collective identity has not been 
developed by supporters of CGC and the antagonists have not been successful at finding 
an identity that sticks to the group and its members. 
 Within the community of Centreville and the state of Maryland, CGC supporters 
have had a number of political opportunities that were not present in the other two cases.  
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First, the state of Maryland has fairly stringent requirements for development and 
community planning.  Development is particularly restrictive along the Chesapeake Bay 
and its tributaries.  This offered considerable leverage for the group.  Second, throughout 
the conflict, CGC had a number of sympathetic individuals both on the Town Council 
and Planning Commission.  Third, the local newspaper has not come out in favor of the 
Wharf development, and it has printed all letters to the editor unedited.  There is also no 
strong evidence that a significant portion of the local community support private 
development on the property.  Fourth, and perhaps most importantly, at a critical juncture 
in the Wharf property dispute, the town of Centreville underwent a number of significant 
developments.  These developments also led to something far more problematic for the 
community, which was raw sewage being pumped directly into the Corsica River.  The 
months following the sewage story key town officials lost their jobs, state and federal 
environmental agencies investigated the pollution allegations, the town and state imposed 
moratoriums on all local developments, and the local television news station continued to 
report on the sewage problem attributing it to overdevelopment.  The combination of 
these factors in particular caused major turmoil within the local town government.   
 Despite the group’s political successes, CGC and its supporters did not have any 
significant gains in SOCIAL or IDENTITY.  There has not been much evidence that 
CGC and its leadership have made any significant changes in structural location, and it is 
fairly evident CGC supporters have not formed a cohesive social identity.  These two 
shortcomings may influence the group’s ability to mobilize high levels of support for 
other local land-use issues.  The movement has almost entirely been defined by its 
opposition to the Wharf.  The group may have difficulty redefining its image and 
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amassing the financial and human capital necessary to create broader policy changes and 
to gain representation within the town government. 
 When the cases are combined identifying similarities and differences using QCA, 
a simplified path is found for each of the outcome properties.  Little can be added to the 
discussion about cultural outcomes, specifically IDENTITY, because there is only one 
case that had a fairly clear outcome of collective identity.  The simplest combination is J 
= AbCDefGhI (see Table 11). 
Table 11. Pathway to Cultural Outcomes 
Pathways Cultural Outcomes 
VIABLE * tactics * HIGH PART * FRAMES * pos * indig 
* MEDIA * public 
 
IDENTITY 
 
It appears the combination of a strong and highly organized SMO, evidence of broad-
based support, and clearly defined frames with little support from government officials, 
local business members, and the media have created prime conditions for a cohesive 
collective identity to form. 
When looking at the social outcome of social capital (SOCIAL), both Ames and 
Brunswick displayed evidence of changes in structural location in broader social 
networks and increases in social capital.  Using QCA and the process of simplification, 
the following can be deduced through Boolean addition: I = ABCdEFGH (Ames) + 
AbCDefGh (Brunswick) MINIMIZATION I = ACG (see Table 12). 
Table 12. Pathway to Social Outcomes 
Pathways Social Outcomes 
VIABLE * HIGH PART * MEDIA 
 
SOCIAL CAPITAL 
 
The results suggest that a combination of a viable SMO, high levels of participation, and 
favorable media coverage for the development help increase social capital.  This result 
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could be attributed to combination of factors.  First, SMOs that are organized, or at least 
are perceived as being organized may be seen as legitimate by actors within the broader 
context.  A viable organization could also be helpful in drawing in supporters both 
because it is seen as legitimate but also because it is organized enough to quickly 
mobilize important resources, in this case, human capital to sustain a large number of 
supporters.  Finally, although it could be looked at as a negative to have the local media 
come out in support of a development proposal, it could also be argued any coverage by 
the media is potentially advantageous for social movement supporters.   
For both ASG and BSG proponents, their participation in the land-use dispute, 
whether covered in a positive light or not, puts the social movement’s message and 
concerns out to the broader public.  This coverage by the media may help legitimize the 
group and its concerns within the broader community.  As a result, lead SMOs and 
movement leadership may become an attractive group for other citizen groups to go to for 
help or information.  These SMOs and leaders may also be seen as the voice of opposing 
views and therefore a group to go to for at least the appearance of diverse viewpoints by 
social and political organizations. 
Finally, related to political outcomes, there are three measures included: POLICY, 
REPRESENT, and STOP.  Table 13 displays the simplest paths to the three different 
outcomes.   
Table 13. Pathways to Political Outcomes 
Pathways Political Outcomes 
VIABLE * POS * identity 
 
POLICY 
VIABLE * POS * identity 
 
REPRESENT 
VIABLE * tactics * FRAMES * public 
 
STOP 
99 
 
 
 
Using the same process of minimization, the simplest combination of causal factors for 
POLICY is X = ABCdEFGHIj (Ames) + AbcDEfghij (Centreville) MINIMIZATION X 
= AEj.  The findings reveal the combination of viable organization, favorable political 
opportunity structures, and lack of collective identity act jointly to help successful policy 
political outcomes.  As suggested by a number of research studies, this finding suggests a 
combination of internal movement characteristics and environmental factors are 
important to influence changes in the political arena.  This is also the same combination 
of factors related to positive political outcomes as they relate to gaining representation 
within the political arena.  For REPRESENT, Y = ABCdEFGHIj (Ames) + AbcDEfghij 
(Centreville) MINIMIZATION Y = AEj.  Furthermore, in the case of land-use 
movements, the lack of cohesive collective identity may ultimately help the social 
movement in the political arena specifically as it relates to policy changes and gaining 
representation.  One reason for this could be, as depicted in these three case studies, the 
claim that the movement represents the concerns of the broader community.  However, if 
the group is either painted as partisan, issue-oriented, or unresponsive to others, this 
could negatively affect the chance for changing policies or gaining representation. 
Finally, both Brunswick and Centreville helped stop the mobilizing development.  
Again, when QCA is applied, the following equation is Z = AbCDefGhIJ (Brunswick) + 
AbcDEfghij (Centreville) MINIMIZATION Z = AbDfh.  Because INDIG appears, in this 
case, to be an irrelevant factor, it has been removed to simplify the equation even more to 
Z = AbDh.  The finding suggests, first, the importance of a viable SMO and clearly 
defined collective action frames.  Both BSG and CGC proved to have a formidable lead 
SMO and maintained a consistent message of the problem and solution.  Second, 
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although both groups engaged in political and legal tactics, neither used disruptive tactics 
to stop a development proposal.  This finding does go against a body of literature, which 
suggests that disruptive (specifically violent) and innovative tactics are positively related 
to political outcomes.  This discrepancy could be attributed to a small sample size, or it 
could be attributed to the type of conflict being engaged.  Land-use issues, and 
specifically movements related to growth management and land-use planning and 
development, are usually fought (and won) in communities with high levels of socio-
economic status and are usually not viewed as life and death issues.  Finally, one of the 
most revealing factors is the lack of broad-based support for the development(s).  For 
both BSG and CGC, there was no evidence of major opposition to smart growth, whether 
organized or unorganized.  If anything, public opinion seemed to be strongly opposed to 
the each of the developments that were eventually stopped.   Public meetings were 
disproportionately in favor of the protagonists.  Letters to the editors were strongly in 
support of these respective movements or in opposition to the development(s). 
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CHAPTER IX 
CONCLUSION 
There are a number of important findings derived from multiple sources of data, 
which included field observations, in-depth interviews, newspaper articles, and SMO 
literature.  First, related to the outcome of collective identity within the cultural arena, 
only one of the three cases displayed the emergence of a cohesive collective identity.  
This finding suggests the emergence of a collective identity resulted from an adversarial 
environment, lack of opportunity, highly organized SMO, and a clear message (see Table 
14).   
Table 14. SMO Controlled Factors, Environmental Factors, and Cultural Outcomes 
 BSG Cultural Outcome 
SMO Controlled 
Factors 
Viable organization: regular 
meetings, ongoing campaigns, 
clear leadership, committed 
core members, effective 
fundraising efforts, diverse 
range of professional 
occupations. 
 
Clear message: clearly 
identified problem (diagnostic 
frame) and solution (prognostic 
frame). 
 
Emergence of collective 
identity: evidence of smart 
growth and activist identity. 
 
Environmental 
Factors 
Lack of political opportunity 
structure: no recent periods of 
crisis related to development, 
partisan elections, no 
sympathetic elites, stability in 
Republican leadership. 
 
 
There is evidence of two types of identities that emerged in all three cases, but 
especially prominent in BSG: an “organizational” and an “activist” identity (Jasper 
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1997).  The organizational identity is one that is connected to an individual organization 
and its members.  All three of the cases displayed some commitment to organization.  For 
BSG, it was a smart growth identity.  However, even more prominent was the activist 
identity, or an identity created through sustained political involvement.  Furthermore, 
there is evidence, especially with BSG, of other community members attempting to frame 
the group and shape a negative image.  For BSG, this could have made it difficult to 
recruit widespread opposition to the developments, get candidates elected to local town 
government, connect with other important organizations and businesses, and make gains 
in the policy realm (Polletta and Jasper 2001).    
Second, the social outcome of increases in social capital is found in both ASG and 
BSG.  Changes in structural location or increasing connections with other individuals and 
groups within the community can be attributed to a viable SMO, sustained participation, 
and coverage by the media (see table 15).  For both of the lead SMOs in ASG and BSG, 
there is evidence of changes in structural location within local community social 
networks.  Both groups have formed new relationships with existing local organizations, 
businesses, and political groups.  Additionally, both groups have been sought out by local 
groups and media sources for input on land-use issues and decisions, usually to represent 
an alternative view.  Finally, especially evident in the ASG case, a number of the 
movement leaders have taken up other leadership posts within the community.  What this 
suggests is social movements can be successful within the social arena, specifically 
making and maintaining new social bonds, which strengthens and broadens a social 
movement social network.  This also results in changes in structural location.  Changes in 
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structural location as well as forging new social bonds can open up chances for success 
within the political arena later (Diani 1997).   
Table 15. SMO Controlled Factors, Environmental Factors, and Social Outcomes 
 ASGA & BSG Social Outcome 
SMO Controlled 
Factors 
Viable organization: regular 
meetings, ongoing campaigns, 
clear leadership, committed 
core members, effective 
fundraising efforts, diverse 
range of professional 
occupations. 
 
Sustained participation: large 
number of participants at SMO 
sponsored events and 
meetings, large quantity of 
supportive letters to the editor 
and petition signatures.  
 
Increase in social capital: 
interorganizational cooperation 
with existing organization, 
smart growth leadership in 
other community leadership 
positions 
 
Environmental 
Factors 
Media coverage: coverage of 
the development and the group 
in the local newspaper.  
 
 
 Finally, a couple of major points relate to successful political outcomes.  First, 
this research offers further evidence successful political outcomes appear to be related to 
a combination of internal movement characteristics and environmental factors.  More 
specifically, all three cases had various levels of political success ranging from outright 
stopping the mobilizing development to gaining important representation within decision 
making bodies to influencing policy changes.  There is evidence of the necessity of a 
viable SMO and clear message (at least clear identification of the problem).  
Furthermore, there is strong evidence the political context must be favorable for 
successful outcomes whether this involves periods of crisis, sympathetic elites, open and 
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responsive officials, state level policies, or supportive (or potential ambiguous) public 
opinion (see table 16).   
Table 16. SMO Controlled Factors, Environmental Factors, and Political Outcomes 
 ASGA, BSG, & CGC Political Outcomes 
SMO Controlled 
Factors 
Viable organization: 
regular meetings, ongoing 
campaigns, clear leadership, 
committed core members, 
effective fundraising 
efforts, diverse range of 
professional occupations. 
 
Clear message: clearly 
identified problem 
(diagnostic frame) and 
solution (prognostic frame) 
 
Policy changes: changes to 
comprehensive plan and 
development plans, smart growth 
initiative, open call for public input. 
 
Represent: gain access to decision 
making body such as city/town 
council or planning and zoning 
commission. 
 
Stop development: stop 
development(s) Environmental 
Factors 
Periods of crisis: 
experience rapid 
development or 
environmental hazard. 
 
Political opportunity 
structures: experience rapid 
development, open and 
responsive officials, state 
level policies, nonpartisan 
elections, sympathetic 
elites, instability in elite 
alignments,  
 
 
Public opinion: supportive 
(or potential ambiguous) 
public opinion.   
 
 
For both ASG and CGC, the importance of periods of crises and political 
opportunity structures, and the lack of crisis and POS for BSG, appears to be a decisive 
factor in how successful the social movement is within the political arena (e.g., all three 
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outcomes present for CGC, two for ASG, and only one for BSG).  As a final point, there 
is evidence that the role of public opinion in stopping the development is important for 
this political outcome.  For BSG and CGC, the lack of broad based public support for the 
development(s) in combination with state level policy may have stopped the development 
from occurring.   
More broadly, identifying multiple measures of outcomes from different arenas of 
social life offers a more precise and accurate description of “successful” social movement 
outcomes.  The analytical framework of three overlapping arenas of social movement 
outcomes could be helpful in examining other social movements.  More specifically, the 
framework could be helpful in identifying which arena is placed as the ultimate 
dependent variable and which arenas act as intermediate outcome variables.  
Furthermore, by conceptualizing these arenas as overlapping and influencing one another, 
social movement outcomes are not seen as occurring all at once at one point in time.  Nor 
are they seen as resulting in either a categorical outcome of success or failure.  By 
including multiple indicators of social movement outcomes, social movement analysts 
can more accurately judge and differentiate between levels of success.  This is especially 
the case for social movements of similar size and purpose.  It does not do social 
movement researchers much good by simply stating that a social movement has either 
succeeded or failed because like most phenomenon in the social world, the answer is 
usually much more complex and requires more nuanced analyses and discussions.  Also, 
this conceptualization allows researchers to examine a multitude of outcomes, which will 
help at parsing apart how some causal factors relate to specific arenas of outcomes and 
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how others lead elsewhere.  Furthermore, this conceptual framework also offers insight 
into how gains in one arena may help or hinder gains in another arena. 
SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
 This research points toward two additional areas of research.  The first is related 
to additional study of land-use social movement such as the ones presented in this 
dissertation.  Because there are only three case studies, it would be useful and worthwhile 
to add more case studies to the analyses to further examine how internal SMO 
characteristics and external environmental factors relate to social movement outcomes for 
land-use social movements such as smart growth social movements.   
The second point is related to general methodological and theoretical issues of 
social movement outcomes.  More specifically, because this dissertation strictly focuses 
on one type of social movement, land-use or smart growth movements, it may have 
limited generalizability to other types of social movements.  As a result, future research 
using the analytical framework outlined in this dissertation could be applied to a number 
of different social movements to examine how specific variables relate to specific arenas 
of social movement outcomes and how this may or may not differ according to the type 
of social movement.  As discussed earlier, although many, in fact, probably the majority, 
of social movements target political outcomes as their primary target, there are cases 
where either social outcomes or cultural outcomes are either equally as important or are 
considered the ultimate outcome of the social movement.  By examining other social 
movements that either fall outside the realm of contentious land-use issues or that focus 
on different outcomes, social movement researchers can better come to an agreement 
regarding social movement outcomes. 
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APPENDIX A: INITIAL QUESTIONS FOR SMO 
I. How did [the group] start?  What year did [the group] form? 
 
 
II. How has [the group] changed since it began? 
 
 
III. What initiatives/campaigns is [the group] currently working on?   
 
 
IV. What tactics (i.e.-lobbying of elected officials, letters to the editor,  
litigation, etc.) has [the group] taken to push smart growth principles? 
 
 
V. How has the general public of [the city] responded to [the group]?  To smart growth 
principles?   
 
 
VI. How has the local city government responded?  How have local developers  
responded?  And how has the local media (newspaper or otherwise) responded? 
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APPENDIX B: INTERVIEWING INSTRUMENT 
 
Formal Interviewing Instrument 
 
I.  Personal Involvement (Self) 
 
A.  When did you join [the organization]? 
 
B.  Why did you join the [organization]?  How did you get involved? 
 
C.  Have you ever been involved with local city politics (specifically related land-use 
issues) prior to joining [the group]?  If so, can you explain what you were involved 
in? 
 
D.  In general, have you ever participated in social movement activity before (e.g., 
lobbied elected officials, written letters to the editor or elected officials, participated 
in protest events or civil disobedience, etc)? 
 
E.  Do you think that your participation in [the group] changed how others view you? 
If so, how? 
 
F.  Has participation in [the group] changed how you think about yourself?  If so, 
how? 
 
II.  Internal Organizational Operations (SMO) 
 
A.  What do you consider the main purpose(s) of [the organization]? 
 
B.   How successful do you consider the [organization] at achieving the goals you 
have identified?  How so? 
 
C.  What do you consider the strongest part of the [organization]? 
 
D.  What do you consider the weakest part of the [organization]? 
 
III.  Local Environmental Context 
 
A.  In general, how do you think the local community has responded [the 
organization] (positively or negatively)?   
 
B.  Similarly, how do you think city officials have responded to [the organization] 
(positively or negatively)?   
 
C.  Finally, how do you think [local media] has responded to [the organization] 
(positively or negatively)?   
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D.  Overall, where do you feel [the organization] has been most influential (e.g., 
community, political process)? 
 
E.  Within the [the city], what do you consider to be the biggest hurdles when it 
comes to the success of [the organization]? 
 
F.  Similarly, what do you consider to be the most useful/helpful part of [the city] 
when it comes to the success of [the organization]? 
 
G.   Do you have any questions or comments? 
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